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RECENT CASES
Antitrust-Informal Price-Information Exchanges Held
Violative of Sherman Act
The United States brought a civil action to enjoin an alleged
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act' predicated upon the use by
defendants,2 manufacturers of corrugated containers, of an informal,
oral system of price information exchange. 3 The Government
contended that the defendants' exchange of current price information
concerning specific sales to identified customers had the effect of
restricting price competition.4 Noting a downward trend in prices,
defendants maintained that the record could not justify a finding that
the mere exchange of price information had an unreasonable effect on
pricing.5 The district court held that the requesting and furnishing of
price information by the defendants did not have the effect of
restricting price competition.' On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. An informal exchange of current price
information resulting in restricted price competition is a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Container
Corporation of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
1. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964): "Every contract,
combination in the form ot trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
2. Of the 51 producers of corrugated containers in the Southeast, the 18 defendants
account for 90o of the market. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 342
(1969) (dissenting opinion).
3. Whenever price information was needed and was not available from another source,
each defendant could request from a competitor his most recent price charged or quoted. The
defendants demonstrated that they were free to withdraw from the agreement at any time and
that exchanges of information were infrequent and irregular. Furthermore, such data was often
available from various records or from the customers themselves. Id. at 335.
4. According to plaintiff's line of reasoning, the restricted competition resulted in a
stabilization of prices. "[lI]n terms of market operations, stabilization is but one form of
manipulation." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
5. The trend of corrugated container prices has been downward with capacity exceeding
demand from 1955 to 1963, the period covered by the complaint. The defendant contended that
falling prices, coupled with an industry expansion of 30 manufacturers in 1955 to 51
manufacturers in 1963, indicated that competition had not been restrained. Furthermore, "an
abundance of raw materials and machinery makes entry into the industry easy with an
investment of $50,000 to $75,000." United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S.
333, 336 (1969).
6. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 67 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
The district court concluded that the Government had not met its burden in producing evidence
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A successful prosecution for violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act requires the finding of a "contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade." In Standard Oil of New Jersey v.
United States,7 the Supreme Court held that a "rule of reason" was
determinative of the legality of restraints of trade. Simply stated, the
rule of reason condemns agreements vhich are unreasonably
restrictive of competitive price conditions.8 Board of Trade of Chicago
v. United States' modified the rule of reason by making it clear that
proof of power, purpose, and effect was required to establish the
illegality of a price-fixing agreement under the Sherman Act.
Therefore, the parties to an illegal price-fixing agreement were
required to have the power and intent to affect price, coupled with
success in reaching their goal. Subsequently, in a series of four
decisions concerning exchanges of price information,'" the Court
relaxed the evidentiary requirement of a purpose to fix prices and
to support the inference that defendants exchanged price information "for the purpose of
maintaining substantially identical price quotations to specific customers or minimizing the
amount of any price reductions to be offered to such customers." id. The district court
analogized the instant case to the fact situations presented in Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925), and Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S.
563 (1925).
7. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). It has been suggested that Mr. Chief Justice White, who delivered
the majority opinion, established a test of reasonableness "to alleviate and yet preserve the
previously misdirected impetus given the Sherman Act by Justice Peckham." Morris, Is Price-
Fixing Per Se Reasonable? A Discussion, 47 KY. L.J. 63, 65 (1958).
8. 1955 AT-r'Y GEN. NAT'L COMN. ANTITRUST REP. 5.
9. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Mr. Justice Brandeis upheld a grain-exchange rule fixing prices at
the closing bid on grain "to arrive." He concluded that: "the true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to . . .the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable." Id. at 238. But see Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Peck & Sons, 220 U.S. 373
(1911), where the language seemed to condemn all resale price-maintenance agreements. Peppin,
Price-Fixing Agreements Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 667, 702-04
(1940).
10. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (upholding the
distribution by an association of information pertaining to specific job contracts to avoid
possibility of fraud); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925)
(upholding the circulation without comment of honest cost figures among a group of lumber
manufacturers); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (condemning a
basing-point system of price-fixing); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377 (1921) (condemning the distribution of elaborate statistics and "suggestions" as to
prices by an association of lumber dealers). One writer has suggested that the fundamental
distinction between the American Linseed and American Column cases as opposed to the Maple
Flooring and Cement Mfrs. cases is that "in the former the parties to the combination were
projecting themselves into the running of each other's business to the detriment of the buying
public, whereas in the latter cases the parties to the agreement were trying to conduct their
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focused on the power to affect market forces and on the actual effect
produced." An exception to the rule of reason was forged in the
significant decision of United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 12
in which Mr. Justice Stone, relying on a "power" interpretation,
adopted a per se rule, 3 which eliminated a balancing of economic
factors and their possible economic effects." Thus, Trenton Potteries
stands for the proposition that price-fixing is unreasonable per se if
the parties have the power to affect the market. s The "power"
interpretation has been affirmed in two subsequent decisions," both of
which upheld the agreements in question. The Court concluded that
the intent to fix prices was not illegal per se if the parties were
without power to affect market prices. Until 1940, therefore, the
Court did not condemn price-fixing agreements among parties who
did not have the power to affect market prices. That year, however, in
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.," the Court broadly
expanded the scope of the price-fixing rule, concluding that: (1) the
rule applied to all arrangements intended to affect price; 8 (2) a
showing of market control was not necessary; 9 and (3) a showing of
the reasonableness of fixed prices or of ruinous competition was not a
businesses intelligently by seeking information which, while helpful to them, was not harmful to
competitors or to the buying public." E. HODGES, ANTITRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT
43-44 (1941).
II. See Comment, The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing-Sans Purpose, Power, or Effect,
19 U. Cm. L. REV. 837, 853-54 (1952).
12. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
13. Id. at 398: -[U]niform price-fixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a
trade or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Law, despite the
reasonableness of the particular prices agreed upon." The Board of Trade of Chicago case was
distinguished as affecting "only a small proportion of the commerce in question." Id. at 401.
14. See Morris, supra note 7, at 63. Clearly, the per se approach lightened the
Government's burden in establishing a price-fixing agreement as a restraint of trade.
15. See Comment, supra note 11, at 855.
16. In Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), the Court
upheld an agreement fixing royalty rates among owners of conflicting patents. The Court found
no evidence of "control of the entire industry as would make effective the alleged domination of
a part." Id. at 179. In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), the
Court upheld a common selling agency with price-fixing powers on the theory that the agency
did not have the power to affect the market price of coal. Id. at 373.
17. 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See I S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES ch. 3 (1958).
18. 310 U.S. 150, 225 n.59 (1940). For a discussion of Socony, see Rahl, Price
Competition and the Price-Fixing Rule-Preface and Perspective. 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 137, 141
(1962).
19. 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940): "But that does not mean that both a purpose and a
power to fix prices are necessary for the establishment of a conspiracy under § I of the
Sherman Act. . . . [A] conspiracy to fix prices violates § I of the Act though no overt act is
shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available for
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defense. "0 Although the elimination of the requirement of market
control in Socony was not essential to the decision since the
Government had established that respondents did have the power to
affect prices, 21 it is precisely this point which has increased the scope
of the price-fixing rule 2 Based on a belief that price competition is a
market force, the rule is applicable in a wide variety of situations. 2
By eliminating market power considerations, Socony had the affect of
making purpose to fix prices determinative of the legality of an
agreement 4 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
in the light of section 1 of the Sherman Act, price-fixing is illegal per
se.2 On the other hand, absent a purpose to fix prices, a separate line
of cases has supported the rule of reason approach of balancing
economic factors2
In the instant case, the Court looked to the reciprocal nature of
the price-information agreement zz in order to find concerted actions,
as required by section 1 of the Sherman Act. 28 After this initial
accomplishment of their objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part of the...
commerce in the commodity." See Rahl, supra note 18.
20. 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). See Rahl, supra note 18.
21. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
22. The Court concluded that a conspiracy to fix prices violates § I of the Sherman Act
even though no overt act is proven. Consequently, market control is irrelevant if an intent to fix
prices is demonstrated. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 225-26 n.59
(1940).
23. See Rahl, supra note 18 for a compilation of cases. It is important to note that the
rule also applies to agreements to lower prices. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328
U.S. 781 (1946).
24. The agreement itself, therefore, has become the focal point of investigation. If the
thrust of the agreement indicates an intention to fix prices, the per se rule will apply. See
generally Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743, 752 (1950); Turner,
The Dejinition oJ Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Rejusals to
Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962).
25. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v.
New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
26. E.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Standard Oil
Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931); Board of Trade of Chicago v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
27. Mr. Justice Douglas, who delivered the majority opinion, reasoned that each defendant
furnished data to his competitor with the expectation that he would be furnished with similar
information upon his request. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335
(1969). The district court, however, had previously held that the Government had failed to
establish the existence of an agreement to exchange price information. The district court relied
upon'the infrequency and lack of uniformity of the information furnished in making its decision.
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 58-59 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
28. Section I requires a finding of a "contract, combination ...or conspiracy ....
Sherman Antitrust Act § I, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § I (1964).
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determination, the Court addressed itself to the question of whether
the exchange of price information had the effect of restraining price
competition. In this regard, the Court examined the agreement's effect
on pricing during the period covered by the complaint. -Although
prices were falling, the Court concluded that the reciprocal exchange
of current prices had a stabilizing effect on the prices at the
downward level.29  The Court reasoned that knowledge of a
competitor's price encouraged the defendants to match that price,
thus reducing price competition. Stabilizing prices, as well as raising
them, is banned by section 1 of the Sherman Act0 The Court relied
upon United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.3 1 for the
proposition that "interference with the setting of price by free market
forces is unlawful per se."'32 The Court conceded that in some markets
price-information exchanges will have no effect on a truly competitive
price; however, in the instant case, the exchange of price data resulted
in price uniformity.3 3 Therefore, the Court concluded that "the
inferences are irresistible that the exchange of price information has
had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of
price competition." Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, 5
reasoned that absent a per se violation, circumstances must show an
actual effect on pricing. Justice Fortas concluded that an actual effect
had been established by the Government, thereby making section 1
applicable. Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting,3 1 found neither a per se
29. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1969).
30. See note 4 supra.
31. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
32. 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
33. In making this conclusion, the Court indicated that the following factors were
relevant: the corrugated container industry is an oligopoly dominated by relatively few sellers;
the product is fungible; the demand is inelastic; and the competition for sales is price. Id.
34. Id. -Price is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an
informal manner to restrain competition.;' Id. at 338.
35. Id. (Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring). Absent a per se violation, the plaintiff
must establish that the practice resulted in an unreasonable restraint on trade. Justice Fortas
reasoned that the evidence "'although not overwhelming," was sufficient to show an actual effect
on pricing. "[Defendants' tacit agreement to exchange information about current prices to
specific customers did in fact substantially limit the amount of price competition in the industry.
That being so, there is no need to consider the possibility ofaperse violation." Id. at 340.
36. Id. (Mr. Justice Marshall dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall would have affirmed the
findings of the district court that the corrugated container industry was highly competitive. The
downward trend of prices and the increase in the number of manufacturers would seem to
support the findings of the district court. Justice Marshall did not accept the Government's
contention that "prices would have been more unstable and would have fallen faster without
price information." Id. at 346.
19691
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violation nor a restraint on competition. Justice Marshall noted that
price-information exchanges have been refused per se treatment in the
past, and after an examination of the record, concluded that the
Government had not proved its case 7
A cursory reading of the instant case would suggest that the
Supreme Court has extended per se reasoning to the practice of price-
information exchange. Mr. Justice Douglas, author of the Socony
opinion, indicated in the instant case that the exchange of current
prices resulted in a reduction of price competition which is unlawful
per se 8 Furthermore, Justice Douglas did not weigh economic factors
relating to the reasonableness of the agreement, but rather condemned
the arrangement for having any effect on price.39 However, it is
submitted that there is evidence of underlying reasoning in the instant
decision which indicates that the Court employed more than a simple
per se approach. Relative to price-information exchanges, it appears
that the Court has made academic the distinction between the per se
approach and the rule of reason approach. By measuring factual
situations against certain criteria, the result reached using either
approach is practically uniform. These criteria are purpose, effect and
justification. If an examination of a price-exchange agreement yields a
finding that the parties to the agreement intended to fix prices, the
Court, relying upon Socony, will find a per se violation. Therefore,
the defendant must establish at the outset of his case that the
agreement was not intended to fix prices, since a finding of improper
purpose will necessarily result in an adverse holding. In the instant
case, the Court found no express purpose to fix prices and therefore
considered the effect and justification of the agreement. It is in this
area that the distinction between per se and rule of reason is
eliminated. If the agreement affects price, it will be declared illegal
unless an affirmative justification is demonstrated. Absent a showing
of justification, the agreement is both unlawful per se and
unreasonable under the rule of reason approach. In the instant case,
37. Id. at 344, 347. Justice Marshall believed that the information was used to reach
individual price decisions and not used as a basis to fix prices. Id. at 394.
38. Citing Socony for the proposition that "interference with the setting of price by free
market forces is unlawful per se," Justice Douglas concluded that the reduction of price
competition brought the instant case within the ban. Id. at 337.
39. The idea that price competition is the "central nervous system" of the economy has
been challenged: "the concept of competition that has grown out of the antitrust laws is not
confined to price competition, but accords a place to competition as affecting productive




defendants argued that the agreement did not have an effect on
competition,." not that the agreement was justified.' Finding an effect
on price and no affirmative justification, the Court held the agreement
illegal. At this point, the per se and rule of reason approaches merge,
since the application of either to the instant agreement yields an
identical result.
Conflict of Laws- "Contacts" Doctrine Applied to Supplement
Federal Maritime Law in Diversity Action
Plaintiff brought a diversity action in federal court to recover for
the death of plaintiff's decedent in an airplane crash occurring in the
navigable waters of Boston harbor. A round-trip ticket between
Philadelphia and Boston had been purchased by the deceased in
Pennsylvania, his domicile and the state in which his estate was
administered. The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found that the defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of decedent's death. On the question of damages, plaintiff
argued that the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival Act
should govern, since Pennsylvania had the most significant contacts
with the parties and, consequently, the most significant interest in
having its law applied.' Defendant contended that since the crash
occurred in Massachusetts, the limited liability provisions of the
Massachusetts wrongful death law should apply under the traditional
choice of law rule of lex loci delicti.2 The district court adopted the
40. The dissent made a convincing argument that competition was not affected by the
agreement. 393 U.S. 333, 342-47 (1969).
41. Admittedly, justifications are quite limited and need careful definition. See generally
Turner, Cooperation Anong Competitors, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 865, 869-70 (1967).
1. Pennsylvania's Wrongful Death and Survival Acts allow recovery of the present worth
of the anticipated value of the decedent's estate as it would exist at the end of a normal lifetime.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1601-1604 (1953) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 320.601 (1953).
Plaintiff also argued in the original trial and on rehearing that there was a breach of contract
between decedent and the airlines. The court disposed of defendant's contention that there was
no contractual relationship between the parties by indicating that defendant's liability was
governed by principles of negligence, and not of contract, because the action was for a negligent
breach of contract and not a simple breach of contract. See Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
2. The Massachusetts statutes concerning liability for wrongful death and the survival of
causes of action, in effect at the time of the accident, made one whose negligence had caused the
death of another liable "in damages in the sum of not less than two thousand nor more than
twenty thousand dollar's, to be assessed with reference to the degree of his culpability." Recovery
1969]
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contacts approach and refused to apply the restrictive Massachusetts
law, thus permitting the jury to award full compensation for the loss
under the Pennsylvania law. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the damage award and held that since the tort occurred in
navigable waters, the federal maritime law governed liability for the
tort.3 This federal maritime law, held the circuit court, must be
supplemented by state law in defining the rights of dependents to
recover for wrongful death. In choosing which state's law is to be
used to provide this supplementation, the circuit court applied the
choice of law rule which the federal courts have traditionally applied
in the maritime tort area-the law of the state in which the tort
occurred shall govern. On rehearing, held, reversed. Where state law is
required to supplement federal maritime law in determining the rights
of dependents to recover for wrongful death, the law of the state
which has the most significant contacts with the action will be
applied. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1968).
Historically, maritime law has made no provision for recovery in
wrongful death cases,4 and Congress has provided a legislative remedy
for this deficiency only when death occurs on the high seas.5 The
courts have construed the congressional act to mean that admiralty
jurisdiction applies not only to the high seas, but also to those waters
navigable in fact, regardless of whether or not they are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide.' Where no specific statutory language can be
found to govern the rights of parties arising out of a tortious act
occurring within the scope of federal maritime jurisdiction, the courts
have applied a simple rule of "borrowing" under which maritime law
will accord relief neither more nor less extensive than would be
enjoyed under the law of the state in whose territorial waters the tort
occurred. 7 As a consequence, admiralty law has traditionally been
supplemented by the law of the state of the tort. However, recent
developments in choice-of-law rules have signified a trend away from
of certain expenses incurred as a result of the wrong were also permitted. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 228, § 1(2) (1955) and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (1955).
3. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 375 U.S. 940
(1963), involved the same set of facts as the instant case and the court ruled that the case was
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.
4. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). For an extensive discussion, see Currie, State
Laws in Maritime Death Cases. 21 'VAND. L. REv. 297 (1968).
5. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964).
6. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) I (1870).
7. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). See also Hess v. United States, 361
U.S. 314 (1960); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
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the traditional application of the choice-of-law theory of lex loci
delicti and toward application of the law of the place with the most
substantial interest in the resolution of the issue involved8 This
trend has been reinforced by judicial indications that a state with
some substantial interest in the application of its own laws to the
dispute can constitutionally apply its laws without running afoul of
due process or full faith and credit requirements.' Specifically, the
trend has extended to cases involving international claims under
federal maritime law where several times the application of the rule of
lex loci delicti has been ignored by the courts in favor of a "contacts"
approach, particularly where one state- or nation obviously has a more
significant interest in the occurrence and the parties as to the
particular issue involved than has another. One such case, Lauritzen
v. Larsen,10 analyzed various factors which generally influence the
choice of law governing a maritime tort claim. Premising their
argument on the idea that conflicts of laws should be resolved by
ascertaining and valuing points of contact relating the transaction and
the nations whose competing laws are involved, the Lauritzen court
indicated several such points of contact to be weighed in determining
which state has the most significant governmental interest in applying
its own law: the law of the flag; allegiance or domicile of the injured;
allegiance of the defendant shipowner; place of contract;
inaccessibility of foreign forum; the law of the forum; and the place of
the wrongful act." That court rejected the theory that the place of the
8. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
This is generally a rejection of the "vested rights" doctrine which holds that the right to recover
for a foreign tort owes its creation to the law of the place where the injury occurred. For views
opposed to the vested rights theory, see Cavers, A Critique oJ the Choice-oJ-Law Problem. 47.
HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933); Cheatham, American Theories oJ (onflict of Laws: Their Role and
Utility, 58 HAv. L. REV. 361 (1945); Cheatham and Reese, Choice oJ the Applicable Law. 52
COLUM. L. REV. 959 (1952); Leflar, Choice-InJluencing Considerations in Conjlicts Law. 41
N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966).
9. E.g., Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). This case also
involved the Massachusetts Wrongful Death Act. The court indicated that all the issues
involved should be weighed and should include the conduct of the parties, the extent of their
liability, the period during which the liability may be sued upon, state immunities and insurance
procedures, and the contacts of the states with the transaction. As a result of this weighing
process, the court could apply the law of the state with the most significant contacts to further a
policy of its own even if it were contrary to some provision of the locus statute which created the
cause of action.
10. 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (case involving the issue of applying American (Jones Act),
Danish, or Cuban law to the claim of a Danish seaman who, after joining a Danish vessel in an
American port, was injured in the harbor of Havana).
II. Id. at 583.
1969]
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wrongful act was necessarily a predominant factor in determining the
law governing maritime tort claims. Another case involving
international problems, Romero v. International Terminal Operating
Co., 2 also discounted the importance of the place of the injury in
determining which state's law should apply. The approach of isolating
issues and weighing contacts to determine which jurisdiction has the
most significant interest in the resolution of a particular issue has
been adopted by many jurisdictions13 and given support by The
Tentative Draji of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.14
In its initial hearing of the case, the instant court merely adopted
the traditional rule and applied the law of the state within the
boundaries of which the maritime tort occurred. 5  However, on
rehearing, the court first reconsidered the issue of contractual
obligation and found that even though there was a "contract of
carriage," this contract was for non-negligent carriage and, therefore,
an action would lie either in tort or in contract. Consequently, the
court stated that the fact that a possible contract action existed for a
breach of contract of non-negligent carriage would not provide a basis
for the disallowance of a tort claim under federal maritime law, and
proceeded to reanalyze its previous holding so as to determine the
choice of law rule it should apply to determine which state's statute
12. 358 U.S. 354 (1959). Fol lowing this decision, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have based
their holdings on factors such as nationality rather than place of injury. McClure v. United
States Lines Co., 368 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d
464 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied. 387 U.S. 908 (1967).
13. For cases following the lead of Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), see, e.g.. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d. 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1967); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967); WVartell v. Formusa,
34 ll1.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Griffith
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222
A.2d 205 (1966). See also 21 VAND. L. REV. 266 (1968), and note 8 supra.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964). Note
especially § 379, which sets forth guidelines to assist in determining which state has the most
significant contacts. These guidelines include: "(I) the local law of the state which has the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and
liabilities in tort. (2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of
most significant relationship include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where
the contact occurred, (c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. (3)
In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum will consider the issues, the
character of the tort, and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested states."
15. "If the long and consistently accepted and applied rule of maritime law which requires
that the federal right to recovery in such cases as this be measured by the provisions of
Massachusetts law is to be modified, that change should be made by the Supreme Court." 399
F.2d 14, lb (3d Cir. 1968).
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should govern the damage award. 6 The court rejected defendant's
argument that, since the underlying policy of the Massachusetts
Wrongful Death Act is to deter the commission of tortious acts in
Massachusetts, Massachusetts had a substantial interest in the
application of her law. The court reasoned that this broad policy of
Massachusetts would not be impinged by application of the more
liberal Pennsylvania rule.1 7 The court also held that the application of
Pennsylvania law violated neither the due process nor the full faith
and credit clauses of the United States Constitution, because
Pennsylvania had substantial contact with the activity in question and
thus a sufficient basis to enable it to apply its own law. 8 Restating its
previous holding that when fatal injuries are sustained upon navigable
waters maritime principles will govern the tort aspects of the case,"9
the court rejected the defendant's contention that the law of the place
of the tort should be the choice of law rule applied in choosing which
state's wrongful death laws will supplement maritime law.20 Also
rejecting defendant's argument that the court should follow recognized
judicial holdings that the several states had the power to provide for
claims arising out of fatal injuries sustained in their respective
waters,2' the court indicated that the necessary guidelines for the
proper disposition of the question lay in the significant contacts
approach of Lauritzen v. Larsen2 and similar cases.P Analyzing the
16. Id. at 20-24. The court noted that Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758
(3d Cir.), cert. denied. 375 U.S. 940 (1963), distinguished tort claims which are maritime in
nature and contract claims which are not. The recognition of a diversity claim for breach of
contract in no way preempts the application of federal maritime law to the tortious aspects of
the claim. See note I supra.
17. 399 F.2d at 22-23. The defendant had argued that the Massachusetts Wrongful Death
Act's underlying policy was to deter potential tortfeasors from engaging in tortious conduct in
Massachusetts. The court found this argument unpersuasive in that liability limited to $20,000
could not be as great a deterrent to a tortfeasor as an unlimited liability similar to that of the
Pennsylvania statute.
18. Id. at 23. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
19. Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
940 (1963).
20. 399 F.2d 14, 25 (3d Cir. 1968). Defendant sought support for its contentions in the
fact that it was unable to find one reported case in the Third Circuit involving death upon state
navigable waters wherein the law of the state in which the tort occurred was not applied.
However, the instant court indicated that in none of the cases cited by the defendant was a
choice of law question considered. The one exception was The H.S., Inc. No. 72, 130 F.2d 341
(3d Cir. 1942), in which the court noted in dictum that the law of the state of the tort should be
applied in recovery for a maritime tort under a state death statute.
21. 399 F.2d at 26. See also The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
22. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
23. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); McClure v.
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circumstances of the case, the court found that the most significant
relations and contacts in the case were in Pennsylvania and not
Massachusetts.24 Therefore, having determined that the law of the
place with the most significant contacts with the transaction should be
applied, the court found that the maritime law was correctly
supplemented by the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and Survival
Act. Buttressing its decision, the court noted that admiralty courts,
like state courts, have an obligation to refrain from application of an
inappropriate or inequitable rule and that to apply the Massachusetts
law on damages merely because the airplane happened to crash into
that state's navigable waters would be both inappropriate and
inequitable since the contacts with Pennsylvania law were much more
significant on the damages issue'
In view of the growing trend toward the "significant contacts"
approach in the field of conflict of laws, the instant court reached a
sound decision. It is submitted that the balancing of individual and
governmental interests here led to not only a sound, but also a just
result, particularly insofar as the tort aspects of the case are
concerned. Since torts are rarely planned and since "significant
contacts" will normally fall into reasonably clear groupings, there is
no longer a place for arguing that predictability of result has been
sacrificed. In the instant case, the flexibility afforded the court by
adoption of the significant contacts approach allowed it to avoid the
patent injustice of applying the Massachusetts limited liability law to
the damage claim of Pennsylvania domiciliaries for the death of their
decedent Pennsylvania domiciliary. Clearly, the goal of justice is best
United States Lines, Co., 368 F.2d. 197 (4th Cir. 1966). For summaries of these cases, see notes
10-12 and accompanying text supra.
24. The contract was made in Pennsylvania. Decedent's domicile and the administration
of his estate were there. Only the site of the injury was in Massachusetts.
25. 399 F.2d at 28.
26. Id. at 29. An interesting concurring opinion by Judge Seitz advocated application of
the state choice-of-law rule to all the claims, because the action was on the law side of the court
under diversity jurisdiction, and thus outside of admiralty jurisdiction. Judge Seitz noted that
even though a right of action under maritime law arose as a result of the accident and could
have been asserted under the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court, it did not follow that
recognition of a state common-law right of action entertained under diversity jurisdiction was
thereby foreclosed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964). Judge Seitz stated that there was no overriding
concern for the exclusive application of maritime law and that the recognition of a state law
claim would in no way foreclose the assertion of the maritime rights of the plaintiff in *the event
he should elect to have the matter determined by such principles. In asserting his state law
rights, there seems to be no reason why plaintiff's action could not be maintained as a state law
action under the district court's diversity jurisdiction. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d
14, 29-30 (3d Cir. 1968) (concurring opinion).
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served by application of the Pennsylvania damage rule. The mere
fortuity of death in another state should not control the rights of the
surviving parties, all of whom have intimate contacts with
Pennsylvania and who may be forced to look to that state's
beneficence should their claim be in large measure denied. It may
hardly be contended that the plaintiffs here were not among the
intended beneficiaries of the Pennsylvania damage rule; thus,
application of the foreign statute would frustrate not only the
governmental intent of Pennsylvania, but also the theoretical intent of
the plaintiffs, who by representation, favored such a rule. Although
these arguments are substantially similar to those favoring adoption
of the "significant contacts" approach in other cases, the instant
court is to be commended nonetheless for laying to rest the vested
rights and lex loci delicti rules in yet another area of the law.
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment Prohibits Extended
Postponement of Parole Consideration for State Inmate When
Made on the Basis of an Unreliable Factual Determination
Plaintiff, a state prison inmate, sought declaratory and injunctive
relief in federal court under section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act!
against defendants, the Illinois state penitentiary warden and parole
board chairman, after their decision in 1963 to postpone his scheduled
parole consideration for eleven months. The decision was based on
information from prison guards that plaintiff had possessed
contraband in his cell. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the
"contraband" was a powdered breakfast drink legally available to all
prisoners and that his request for an analysis of the powder was
denied. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964): "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
2. The postponement was from February, 1968, until January, 1969. Plaintiff contended
that this postponement of parole consideration was a cruel and unusual punishment under the
eighth amendment. However, the court relied on the illegality of the procedure used to postpone
parole rather than the severity of the punishment imposed on plaintiff to determine what
substantive legal right had been violated. Therefore, even though plaintiff did not specifically
assert a violation of the equal protection clause, the court by liberally construing the complaint
ascertained that an equal protection violation had occurred.
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state a justiciable claim was granted by the district court. On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals, held, reversed and remanded.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is violated
when a state prisoner is denied parole consideration on the basis of
facts unreliably determined by prison officials. Campbell v. Pate, 401
F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968).
Courts have recognized that prisoners retain certain civil and
constitutional rights during incarceration This judicial philosophy has
become known as the "retained right" doctrine. However, courts have
also recognized that incarceration necessitates limitations on and
withdrawal of certain rights of prisoners4 for purposes of effective
penal administration' and particularly for purposes of disciplinary
control.' Therefore, while recognizing that prisoners retain rights
3. .Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 887
(1945): "A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by
necessary implication, taken from him by law." Accord, Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804
(E.D. Ark. 1967) (constitutional punishment with leather strap may be unconstitutionally admin-
istered); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (equal protection and due process
available despite loss of other rights and privileges).
4. Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948): "Lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system." Accord, Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Grattan) 790
(1871) (as a consequence of his crime, convict not only forfeits his liberty, but all his personal
rights except those which the law in its humanity accords him).
5. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 686 (E.D. Ark. 1965): "[C]onvicts must be
disciplined, and prison authorities must be given wide latitude and discretion in the management
and operation of their institutions. . . . [T]hey cannot undertake to review every complaint
made by a convict about his treatment while in prison." Accord, Cole v. Smith, 344 F.2d 721
(8th Cir. 1965) (absent clear showing of violation of a constitutional right, state prison
administration will not be reviewed by the courts). For federal court policy in regard to federal
penal administration, see, e.g., Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962); Williams v. Steele,
194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1951).
6. Of course, administration and discipline must be interrelated for proper penal
functioning. In Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir. 1963), the court emphasized that
it knew "from sad experience with habeas corpus and 2255 [18 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964)] cases
that imprisoned felons are seldom, if ever, deterred by the penalties of perjury. They do not
hesitate to allege whatever they think is required in order to get themselves even the temporary
relief of a proceeding in court . . . . The disruption of prison discipline that the maintenance of
such suits, at government expense, can bring about is not difficult to imagine." Accord, Roberts
v. Barbosa, 227 F. Supp. 20 (S.D. Cal. 1964). See also Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3rd Cir.
1967); Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964). In Edwards v. Sard, 250 F. Supp. 977
(D.D.C. 1966), the court held that even though racial discrimination was present in the prison
dormitory system, it was not unconstitutional in light of social unrest and conflict, because full
integration would jeopardize the security of the institution. Bitl see Washington v. Lee, 263 F.
Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), where complete
desegregation was ordered within one year in the Alabama jail systems.
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which may be judicially enforced, courts have been extremely
reluctant to interfere with federal' or state prison administration
through the process of judicial review. Thus prison officials have been
permitted to impose on prisoners such discretionary restrictions as
they considered necessary to maintain order within the prison walls.'
This judicial reluctance to interfere with penal management has
become the second philosophy recognized in the court-prison
relationship, the "hands-off" doctrine.'" While the two concepts, the
"retained rights" and the "hands-off" doctrines, are theoretically
concise, difficulties have arisen in particular situations when the
federal courts have had to ascertain which rights confined individuals
in fact retained." The courts have generally held that some rights are
so fundamental that when they are abridged the judiciary should
consider a complaint justiciable. Thus prisoners have obtained court
review of their claims when they have alleged an abuse or denial of
the rights to: religious freedom, 2 access to courts for redressing legal
7. Eg., Tilden v. Pate, 390 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1968); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213 (3rd.
Cir. 1967); People v. Bibb, 252 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1958); United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen,
237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105 (7th Cir.
1953); Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
8. E.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d
548 (4th Cir. 1963); Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
9. At the federal level this policy was espoused in Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th
Cir. 1966); Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1965); Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108
(10th Cir. 1949); Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1934). At the state level, the policy
was espoused in Weyhrauch v. Parker, 268 F. Supp. 785 (M.D. Pa. 1967); Siegel v. Ragan, 180
F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1944).
10. See Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique oj Judicial Refiisal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). Besides the administrative and disciplinary
policies, other reasons exist for the courts' passivity. For example, at the federal level statutory
limitations restrict the courts in their judicial reviewing process. See 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1964).
Further, federal courts have noted that certain rights are incident to state citizenship and
therefore are enforceable only by state courts. E.g., United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237
F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956). Also it has been noted that a proper balance should be struck between
state and federal law enforcement. Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
See also Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945).
I1. See Negrich v. Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1965). In Beckett v. Kearney, 247
F. Supp. 219, 220 (N.D. Ga. 1965), the court stated the problem: "'There is, therefore, in
between the constitutional rights of a prisoner on the one hand and the disciplinary rights of the
authorities on the other hand, a vast no-man's land."
12. E.g.. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (religious beliefs cannot be basis for
denying prisoner right to purchase certain religious publications and for denying him privileges
granted to other prisoners); Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) (religious beliefs
cannot be basis for placing prisoner in solitary confinement and depriving him of good time
credit); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) (prisoner has absolute right to
religious belief of his choice).
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wrongs,'3 essential medical treatment, 4 and equality of treatment
without regard to race.15 However, in order to determine whether a
prisoner had other judicially protected rights, federal courts have
applied various standards, indicating that before an inmate's claim
could be justiciable the alleged violation of the prisoner's right had to
be: shocking to the "general conscience and intolerable to
fundamental fairness,' 6 "extreme,"' 7 "rare and exceptional,"'" or
"conducive to irreparable injury."' 9 Other standards have been used
by the federal judiciary to determine the justiciability of prisoners'
claims.2 0  In balance, however, federal courts continued to show
substantial reluctance to exercise judicial review of the merits of
prisoner complainTs.2
In the instant case the court recognized that, although the
traditional view was that federal courts had no power to regulate the
13. E.g., Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Exparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941);
Haines v. Castle, 226 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1955). In Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir.
1967), the court struck down a prison regulation which permitted a one year delay in parole
consideration for inmates who sought relief through a writ of habeas corpus and were denied. Of
course, a habeas corpus petition 'only tests the legality of detention and not the legality of
treatment when confined. See also Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). For an early history of
in jbrnta pauperis proceedings to obtain redress in federal courts, see Brinkley v. Louisville & N.
R. R., 95 F. 345 (W.D. Tenn. 1899).
14. E.g., Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1966); United States v. Ragen, 337
F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1964); MeCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Gordon v.
Garrson,77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
15. In Washington v. Lee, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), the Court noted that "prison authorities
have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account
racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline and good order in prison." But the Court there
stated unequivocally that this in no way diluted its firm commitment to the fourteenth
amendment's prohibition of racial discrimination. Contra, Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721
(N.D. Cal. 1959).
16. E.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 489 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932
(1964), holding that federal prison officials were not required to meet the demands of Muslim
inmates for special dining hours. See also Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.
1955).
17. Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965) (one letter per day correspondence limit
held reasonable).
18. E.g., Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir. 1965), upholding a regulation
limiting each prisoner to possession of 5 books in his cell.
19. E.g., People v. Bibb, 252 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1958); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81 (7th
Cir. 1944).
20. E.g., Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Marcial v.
Fay, 247 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1957); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967); United
States ex rel. Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
21. See, e.g., Tilden v. Pate, 390 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1968); Negrich v. Hohn, 379 F.2d 213
(3rd Cir. 1967); Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963); Wright v. McMann, 257 F.
Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1966).
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internal discipline of state prisons, in certain instances courts have
allowed redress under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act to
prisoners whose federally protected rights were violated, particularly
the right to equal protection of the laws. The court noted that the
state penal system had adopted a rule which had the effect of
punishing the prisoner by postponing his parole. It further reasoned
that the facts relied on to substantiate the violation by a prisoner
could not be capriciously or unreliably determined, because such a
determination would violate the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The court found that since the
prison warden, in denying parole consideration to plaintiff, relied on
information ascertained capriciously by prison guards, the penal
administration had violated plaintiff's right to equal protection under
the law. Therefore, the court ruled that plaintiff's complaint was
justiciable.
22
The instant decision does not represent an unequivocal
commitment on the part of the federal judiciary to scrutinize more
closely the activities of state penal systems, but it is a step in the right
direction. As the court noted, federal courts have traditionally
refrained from interfering with state prison management, but it is also
important to realize that this restraint has existed at the federal prison
level also.3 Since federal courts have heard prisoners' complaints in
exceptional cases, this case could be considered as no more than
another federal court acting in an exceptional circumstance were it
not for the fact that the circumstances of the instant case are rather
unexceptional when compared to previous cases of prisoner review.
Thus the significance of the instant decision lies in the fact that
although the right violated was not extreme and the punishment
rendered was not extraordinary, the prisoner's complaint was yet
considered justiciable, giving rise to an inference that the federal
judiciary may be headed toward a more zealous protection of
prisoners' rights.
An examination of the state penal system from several
perspectives may illustrate how and why court review can be a
substantial factor in protecting inmate rights. State penal systems are
part of the political system of any state. Usually the high appointive
positions in state penal systems are given to individuals who have
22. See note 2 supra.
23. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
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aided the election of state officials 4 It is probable, therefore, that one
who holds a high penal position is more competent in politics than in
penal administration. The same observation may be applied to those
in immediate contact with the inmates themselves, the prison guards.
They are more interested in maintaining the status quo in the prison
than in its rehabilitative aspects. As long as the prison functions
without major disruption, no one in the political machinery is
disturbed; and because the general public is almost completely cut off
from the reality of prison life, it takes notice of a penal system only
when disruption does occur. Thus, the only alternative channel for
redress of prison injustice is through the courts.
However, before prisoner complaints can be successful in courts,
the complaints must be legally accurate and intelligible; otherwise, a
valid complaint may be rejected on grounds of failure to state a
justiciable claim. In most prisons the inmates have limited access to
legal material; thus it is extremely difficult for them to ascertain
whether they have a valid legal claim against the administration if
they believe a right has been violated. If prisoners do not know the law,
they cannot be expected to know when their rights have been violated;
even with a superficial understanding of the law, it cannot be expected
that they will file a complaint conforming to the pleading
requirements of federal courts. For these reasons courts should be
hesitant to discourage complaints and quick to construe ambiguous
complaints favorably when it is evident that a miscarriage of justice
would result from a strict, technical interpretation of the complaint."
On the other hand, it is argued that prison officials need broad
discretion in managing the internal affairs of the prison, and it would
thus seem anqmalous that the prisoner should have the right to
demand treatment by law equal to that received by those not
24. See J. HAGERTY, TWENTIETH CENTURY CRIME; EIGHTEENTH CENTURY METHODS OF
CONTROL 129 (1934).
25. See Johnson v. Avery, 89 S. Ct. 747 (1969), where the Court noted that it is
fundamental that prisoners may not be denied access to the courts for the purpose of pressing
complaints. The Court held that prisoners in a state penal institution have a federally protected
right to the assistance of fellow inmates in preparing and filing habeas corpus petitions if no
other effective assistance is available.
26. The instant case is an excellent example of a liberal approach to pleading
requirements. The possibility of a poorly framed complaint would be greatly minimized if
prisoners were allowed effective advice when writing complaints. Legal aid organizations should
be permitted to assist prisoners. Such a program would have advantages for the judicial and
prison administrations, since the prisoners could be advised at the outset as to the merit of their
complaints, thus alleviating the need for courts to stretch the bounds of liberal construction or
to become inundated with frivolous complaints.
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incarcerated. It is conceded that in certain instances he does not have
a right to demand such treatment. But these instances should be the
exception and not the rule. One serving a sentence in theoretical
payment of his debt to society should suffer no deprivations in excess
of those inherent in the sentence and in the normal structure of prison
life, and excesses should be subject to judicial review! 7 Just as the
theory of retained legal rights which are enforceable by judicial review
is not absolute, it would seem unreasonable to accept absolutely the
other extreme, the "hands-off" doctrine. Implicit in the "hands-off"
theory is the exaltation of prison discipline over prison rehabilitation,
the net effect of which is to view the prison as fundamentally a
punitive institution. Admittedly, the prison partakes of both
characteristics; yet, the punitive objective of prisons is sufficiently met
by depriving the prisoner of contact with the outside world. This
deprivation of social contact need not be supplemented by additional
arbitrary and judicially non-reviewable treatment of the prisoners for
punitive purposes. If rehabilitation is taken as the key objective of
prisons, it is essential that courts seek to limit administrative
discretion in revoking prisoners' rights, thus encouraging prisoners'
respect for the law. If no such respect is developed, it must be said
that the rehabilitative process has failed substantially.!8 A definitive
policy is necessary, however, in order to allow courts to preserve the
balance between the needs of penal administration and the rights and
privileges of the prisoners, while at the same time serving the
rehabilitative objectives of a penal system.
It is evident that if prison justice is to become a reality, prisoners
must not only be granted access to the courts, but more importantly,
the courts must apply a definite, articulated policy consistently to
determine the justiciability of prisoner complaints. In other words, a
hearing for alleged violations of personal rights should be granted to
prisoners except in those instances when prison security demands rigid
supervision of prisoner mobility and privileges or when prisoner
demands are unreasonable when weighed against the administrative
burden which would result from meeting such demands. It is
submitted, therefore, that courts should decide the question of
justiciability not by applying traditional, ambiguous standards, but
instead by utilizing a balancing test. If inmates realized that their
27. See Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968).
28. It must be recognized that rehabilitation cannot be forced on an inmate; the desire to
change must originate within the individual. See Hodge, The Rehabilitation Process-A
Prisoner's Point of View, 26 Am. J. oF CORRECTION 12 (1964).
1969]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
rights and interests were weighed equally with those of the
administration, their respect for the law would increase, thereby
satisfying one goal of the rehabilitative process. Furthermore, by
opening judicial review to those complainant's rights,21 courts could
upgrade the quality of state prison administration. Prison officials
would be made aware of a more precise standard with which they
must comply when exercising their discretion in curtailing prisoner
rights0 With penal discretion limited to explicit and realistic judicial
guidelines, administrative disregard for prisoners' rights and privileges
could be greatly discouraged 3
Labor Law-Collective Bargaining-Employer May Not
Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreement Provision Embodying
Union Waiver of Employee's Right to Solicit Against That
Union
Willard Ray Dobbins, an employee of Mid-States Metal
Products, Inc., filed a complaint with the NLRB against both Mid-
States and its contracting labor organization, International Chemical
Workers Union, AFL-CIO,' charging that at the union's insistence he
29. Mr. Justice Rutledge noted in his dissent in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 189 (1947),
that economy of judicial time and procedures becomes comparatively insignificant when weighed
against the necessity for the preservation of personal liberty.
30. For instance, when a federal judge considers a writ of habeas corpus he has the
procedural alternative of denying the writ or issuing to the warden an order to show cause why
the writ should not be granted. The same procedure could be suitably employed by the federal
courts in regard to complaints filed by prisoners under § I of the Civil Rights Act. After the
court made the initial determination that the claim was prima facie justiciable, it could then
issue the order to compel the warden to show cause why redress should not be given to the prisoner.
Thus the burden of proof would shift to the warden to show that either prison security or administra-
tive feasibility necessitated the administrative action. See Note, The Burden oJ Federal Habeas
Corpus Petitions from State Prisoners, 52 VA. L. REv. 486 (1966).
Thus if the prisoner presented a prima facie reviewable complaint, shifting the burden to
prison officials to show justification for their acts, there would be a greater tendency for officials
to preserve physical evidence supporting their defense that official discretion was not abused. For
example, in the instant case, since the plaintiff did not reach the federal courts until 6 years after
the alleged contraband incident, it can hardly be expected that the critical evidence, the powder,
still existed.
31. There is a further problem of enforcing injunctive relief against prison officials once
obtained. As long as the prisoners are held incommunicado or denied legal assistance, there is
no positive way to insure compliance with court orders.
1. Local 738, Greenville, Mississippi.
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had been wrongfully discharged by Mid-States for engaging in anti-
union activity. Dobbins alleged that the collective bargaining
agreement provision which purported to prohibit such activity was
illegal. The NLRB found that the union had violated the National
Labor Relations Act by threatening Dobbins with physical violence
and discharge for his activities in attempting to de-certify the union as
the employees' collective bargaining agent through circulation of a
petition for decertification. The Board found that the union
committed an unfair labor practice when it caused the employer to
discharge Dobbins for engaging in activities prohibited by the
collective bargaining agreement 3 The Board also found that the
employer's enforcement of the no-solicitation provision constituted an
unfair labor practice' abridging employee rights guaranteed by section
7 of the Act. Relying upon these findings, the Board issued a cease
and desist order against Mid-States and the union.' On petition to
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by the NLRB for en-
forcement of its order, held, order enforced. An incumbent labor
organization may not waive employee rights to solicit against it
during non-working hours on company premises, and such waiver
may not be enforced as part of a collective bargaining agreement by
the employer since enforcement of such a waiver violates the
fundamental section 7 right of employees to select a collective
bargaining representative of their own choosing. NLRB v. Mid-States
Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968).
Cases involving the validity of collective bargaining agreement
2. The provision purported to prohibit unauthorized soliciting, collection of contributions
and distribution of literature or printed matter for any purpose whatsoever on company
premises.
3. The union was found guilty of violations of National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) §§ 8(b)(I)(A) & 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(l)(A) & 158(b)(2) (1964).
4. Mid-States was found guilty of violating National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) §§ 8(a)(l), (2) & (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (2) &13) (1964). Mid-States contended that it had
discharged Dobbins for possession of a weapon on company premises rather than for his anti-
union activity. Dobbins did have a shotgun in his car during the time immediately preceding his
discharge, but this he claimed was a precaution made necessary by threats of mob violence from
the union. The NLRB concluded that the possession of the weapon was not the real reason for
Dobbins' discharge.
5. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964), provides in
pertinent part as follows: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities.
(emphasis in original).
6. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 872 (1966).
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provisions containing a union waiver of employee solicitation rights
have been before the courts of appeals on three occasions. In NLRB
v. Gale Products, 7 the Seventh Circuit refused enforcement of the
Board's cease and desist order under factual circumstances very
similar to the instant case. The Gale court relied in part upon an
NLRB case which the Board itself had since ceased to follow.8 On the
authority of Gale, the Sixth Circuit decided two cases in which it also
refused to enforce the Board's invalidation of such waiver provisions.
Although minor factual differences distinguish these cases from the
instant case, 0 the Sixth and Seventh Circuits reached the opposite
conclusion, that "[t]he contract provisions here assailed did not
strip the employees of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Act.""
On the other hand, courts have upheld the right of the employer to
promulgate and enforce rules against solicitation on company
premises during non-work time under circumstances where some
limitation on the right to solicit is necessary for the maintenance of
production or discipline.12 The determinative factor in these cases was
the necessity of the restriction imposed rather than the validity of
waiver or enforcement. Further, a number of cases directly involving
union waiver of employee rights have arisen in which the courts have
approved such waiver 3 when necessary to effectuate the congressional
7. 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1964), denying enforcement oJ 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963).
8. May Dep't Stores Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944); accord, Clinton Foods, Inc., 112
N.L.R.B. 239 (1955); Fruitvale Canning Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 884 (1950); ci. North Am. Aviation,
Inc., 56 N.L.R.B. 959 (1944).
9. General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 345 F.2d 516 (6th Cir. 1965), denying enforcement oJ
147 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964); Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir. 1965), denying
enforcement of 148 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1964). See also Getreu v. Armco Steel Corp,, 241 F. Supp.
376 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
10. The major factual difference was that the no-solicitation provisions were enforced
uniformly by the employers against all employees in Gale. Arnico and General Motors, whereas
in the instant case the company's position was that it could enforce or not enforce as it chose.
The Gale court also considered relevant an offer by the company to provide an alternative
means for employee communication among themselves respecting labor organizations.
Additionally, the instant case arose in a right-to-work jurisdiction, Mississippi, while Gal, and
Arnico did not. MIss. CODE ANN. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1966). The instant court, however, stated
specifically that it did not consider this distinction determinative. 403 F.2d at 706 n.8. See
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 174.
11. NLRB v. Gale Products, 337 F.2d 390, 392 (7th Cir. 1964) (emphasis added).
12. E.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. LeTourneau
Co., 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (decided with Republic); Brewton Fashions, Inc. v. NLRB, 361 F.2d
8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 842 (1966); NLRB v. Southwire Co., 352 F.2d 346 (5th
Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961); cJ. Republic Alum. Co. v.
NLRB, 394 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1968).
13. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (agency shop); Teamsters Local
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policy of encouraging collective bargaining. 4 The rationale underlying
these decisions is that the collective bargaining agent must be given a
wide range of flexibility in serving the bargaining unit, making
concessions and accepting advantages in light of relevant
considerations it believes to be in the best interest of the employees it
represents."
In the instant case, the court noted initially that the NLRA was
enacted primarily for the benefit of employees rather than for the
benefit of labor organizations and that the prohibition against unfair
labor practices by employers was intended as a grant of rights to
employees, not of powers to unions. 6 Consequently, union waiver of
these rights should be ineffective except where necessary to further the
policies of the Act'7 and where the union's interests are identical to
those of the employees." Turning to an analysis of the right to solicit
purportedly waived by the International Chemical Workers Union,
the majority reasoned that since the interests of the employee and the
incumbent union in regard to the identity of the collective bargaining
agent might be wholly adverse, the union could have no reason in
such circumstances for preventing solicitation against itself except as a
means of self-preservation. 0 Thus, the court determined that the right
No. 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (hiring hall); NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695
(1961) (hiring by union foremen); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) (no strike or lockout); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958) (ballot and recognition); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954) (union
security); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) (seniority credit for military
service); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (management functions). See,
NLRB v. Lundy Mfg. Corp., 316 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1963). Compare NLRB v. Bell Aircraft
Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining." National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § I, 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
15. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); NLRB v. Lundy Mfg. Corp.,
316 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1963).
16. See NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 193 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1952); NLRB v.
Augusta Chem. Co., 187 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.
1945).
17. See note 14 supra.
18. See cases cited note 13 supra.
19. This right stems from the collective bargaining and organizational rights granted by
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
20. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir. 1945): "A union chosen for a
time to be bargaining representative of a unit which includes members or other unions has no
-right to use its position to destroy the other unions. It must . . . secure itself in its office of
representative only by th6 skill, efficiency, and fairness with which it executes that office."
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to choose a collective bargaining agent includes the right to oust that
agent if and when the employees believe that another union might
better serve as their bargaining representative. Accordingly, the court
reasoned that enforcement of the no-solicitation provision by Mid-
States was essentially a method of favoring the incumbent union over
rivals, an activity consistently condemned by the courts as an unfair
labor practice.2 1 Noting that employer neutrality is required where
employees exercise their fundamental right to choose a collective
bargaining representative, 22 the court concluded that this right is so
fundamental that it should not be subject to waiver by unions nor
subject to prohibition by employers through agreements restricting
employee solicitation against the existing labor organization.
In terms of immediate effect, the instant decision has cast new
doubt on the validity of contracts embodying no-solicitation
provisions and has created a conflict among the circuits. Of the four
cases on the issue, the instant case is the first to adopt the Board's
policy against enforced prohibition of employee solicitation. However,
it is submitted that the court's reasoning is particularly persuasive
despite its minority status, since it is based upon premises which were
not considered controlling in the three cases decided contra.
Fundamental to the instant decision is the determination that an
employer ought to remain neutral when employees exercise their right
to choose or reject a collective bargaining agent 3 Such neutrality
cannot be maintained when the employer enforces an agreement
prohibiting solicitation against the incumbent union. To hold
otherwise would be to legitimize union self-perpetuation with the force
and authority of an enforceable collective bargaining agreement
without regard to the wishes of the employee. The court foresaw the
possible abuses that might flow from approval of a practice that
could have little justification other than union self-interest: with its
own existence guaranteed, the union might have less interest in doing
its best for those whom it represents. The court recognized that such a
situation would impair seriously the employee's right to choose his
bargaining representative freely as well as his right to have the best
21. E.g., NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206 (1940); Majestic Molded Prods.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 114 F.2d 376
(2d Cir. 1940).
22. See generally International Ass'n of Machs. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940); NLRB v.
Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 323 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co.,
144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. John Englehorn & Sons. 134 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1943).
23. See cases cited note 22 supra.
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representation which the agent can furnish. As a result, the court
accepted the NLRB's position against enforcing no-solicitation
provisions by requiring employer neutrality as the best means to
assure that employees' section 7 rights are not violated. This
requirement should, of course, help remove the employer from the
hands of the incumbent union as an effective instrument of self-
preservation. But despite the importance of that ruling alone, the
court's holding that a union may not waive employees' section 7
rights has broad implications beyond the collective bargaining process
itself. If the incumbent union cannot waive employees' section 7
rights, then surely it cannot interfere with those same rights by other
means. Presumably, the union may not resort to overt coercion nor
subtle discrimination in order to gain or retain unfair advantage over
rival organizations. The instant opinion carries strong indications that
such conduct will be disapproved. At any rate, the court's adoption of
Board policy and the persuasive rationale which it gives justifying that
policy should provide convincing precedent for future protection of
employee rights in the selection of collective bargaining
representatives .24
Labor Law-Remedies-NLRB May Order Retroactive
Payment of Fringe Benefits Where Employer Wrongfully
Refuses to Sign Collective Bargaining Agreement
Respondent roofing company was a member of a multi-employer
bargaining association which had negotiated a collective bargaining
contract with the Roofers Union' establishing four-year compensation
levels for the employees of member firms. Respondent sought to
withdraw from the association subsequent to the effective date of the
contract and refused the repeated demands of the union that it sign
the agreement.2 Pursuant to unfair labor practice charges filed by the
union,3 the NLRB found that respondent's refusal to sign the contract
24. See generally Gould, The Question of Union Activity on Company Property, 18
VAND. L. Rav. 73 (1964); 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 174.
I. Roofers Local 36, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof
Workers Association.
2. The contract was to become effective on August 15, 1963. Respondent sought to
withdraw from the association five days later on August 20, 1963. 393 U.S. at 358.
3. Respondent *did not dispute the fact that it withdrew its membership too late to escape
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negotiated on its behalf by the association violated sections 8(a)(l)
and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)A The
Board ordered respondent to sign the contract and to pay to the
appropriate source any fringe benefits provided for in the contract. 5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce that
part of the Board's order requiring the retroactive payment of fringe
benefits on the ground that it was beyond the power of the Board to
order respondent to carry out provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.' On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
held, reversed. Section 10(c) of the NLRA empowers the NLRB to
require the retroactive payment of fringe benefits which would have
been paid to employees had the employer not wrongfully refused to
sign and acknowledge the contract which had been duly negotiated on
its behalf. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
Section 10(c) of the NLRA authorizes the NLRB, where it finds
that any person named in a complaint has engaged in an unfair labor
practice, "to take affirmative action including reinstatement of
employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this Act .... In Phelps Dodge Corporation v. NLRB,8 the
Supreme Court interpreted the remedial power of section 10(c) and
held that the public policy of the Act demands that workers be made
whole for losses suffered on account of unfair labor practices. The
Court reasoned that C.ongress had left to the administrative
competence of the Board the choice of remedies in effectuating this
policy.'" The Board's power to take affirmative action is, however,
the binding force of the agreement negotiated on its behalf. Nor, in light of H.J. Heinz Co. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 514, 524-26 (1941), was there any doubt that respondent's failure to sign the
contract was an unfair labor practice which could be remedied by an order requiring that the
contract be reduced to. writing. The sole issue raised by this case is the power of the Board under
§ 10(c) of the Wagner Act to order an employer to grant retroactive effect to the terms of the
agreement which it refused to acknowledge in writing.
4. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964): "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ... (5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)
5. Joseph T. Strong, 152 N.L.R.B. 9, 14 (1965).
6. NLRB v. Strong, 386 F.2d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
7. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
8. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
9. Id. at 197.
10. Id. at 194: "'Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation or means to end
to the empiric process of administration. The exercise of the process was committed to the
Board, subject to limited judicial review. Because the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a
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subject to two court-created limitations under section 10(c): (1) the
sanction must, be remedial rather than punitive;" and (2) the remedy
must be appropriate to the particular situation confronting the
Board.'2 In general, the Board's authority does not empower it to
adjudicate or administer collective bargaining contracts. 3 Congress
has left enforcement of such agreements to the parties themselves,
through grievance and arbitration procedures, and to the courts,
pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
However, in section 10(a) of the NLRA Congress specified that the
power of the Board to remedy an unfair labor practice "shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise . . . .
Thus the Board may proscribe conduct which is an unfair labor
practice even though the same conduct may be subject to arbitration
as a breach of a collective bargaining agreement," and if necessary,
the Board may interpret the terms of the contract to determine
whether a party has engaged in an unfair labor practice. 7 Section 8(d)
of the NLRAy8 added by the Taft-Hartley Amendments, makes clear
that a refusal to execute a written contract incorporating an
matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's
discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding uhconsciously from the narrow confines
of law into the more spacious domain of policy."
II. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
12. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 342 (1940).
13. See NLRB v. Hyde, 339 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1964); United Steelworkers v.
American Int'l Aluminum Corp., 334 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 1964).
14. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1964): "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties." See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
15. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
16. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962): "The authority of the
Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract
is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the
courts in suits under § 301. If, as respondent strongly urges, there are situations in which
serious problems will arise from both the courts and the Board having jurisdiction over acts
which amount to an unfair labor practice, we shall face those cases when they arise."
17. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428 (1967). "Thus, the Board, in
necessarily construing a labor agreement to decide this unfair labor case, has not exceeded the
jurisdiction laid out for it by Congress."
18. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(d), 158(d): "For the purposes of this
section, to bargain collectively is . . .the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
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agreement reached between the parties is a refusal to bargain in good
faith in violation of section 8(a)(5). 19 In H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 0
the Supreme Court recognized that a refusal to acknowledge the
agreement in writing constituted an unfair labor practice under section
8(a)(5) and upheld an order directing the employer to sign any
agreement reached between the parties' Following the rule in the
Heinz case, the NLRB has on several occasions ordered an employer
to give retroactive effect to the terms of a labor contract where the
Board has determined that there was a wrongful refusal to reduce the
agreement to writing! 2 Prior to the instant decision, however, the
Supreme Court has never ruled on the appropriateness of utilizing this
remedy under the powers authorized in section 10(c) of the Act.
In the instant case the Court found that the Board's order
requiring the respondent to pay fringe benefits reserved in the contract
was well within its section 10(c) powers. The Court initially reviewed
its earlier decisions allowing the Board to remedy an unfair labor
practice where the challenged conduct also constituted a breach of
contract remediable by arbitration. Noting that section 8(d) allows the
Board to inquire whether negotiations have produced an agreement
which the employer refuses to sign, the Court reasoned that the
collective bargaining contract is to this extent within the scope of the
Board's inquiry, just as- determination of an effective remedy for
refusal to sign is well within its section 10(c) authorization. The Court
compared the order in the instant case to the reinstatement of an
employee with back pay when wrongfully dismissed, as for union
membership. Although such conduct may be a breach of contract
open to arbitration, it is also an unfair labor practice which may be
remedied under section 10(c). The majority reasoned that the Board's
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if
requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal
or require the making of a concession ....-
19. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964):
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-. . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) ....
20. 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
21. Id. at 526: "The freedom of the employer to refuse to make an agreement relates to
its terms in matters of substance and not, once it is reached, to its expression in a signed
contract, the absence of which, as experience has shown, tends to frustrate the end sought by the
requirement for collective bargaining."
22. E.g., Schill Steel Prods., Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 939 (1966); Tulsa Sheet Metal Works,
Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1964), enforced, 367 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1966); Ogle Protection Serv.,




order required only the payment of those benefits reserved in the
contract that wQuld have been paid had the employer not engaged in
an unfair labor practice and as such the order was no more than the
Act and cases like Phelps Dodge plainly authorize. Mr. Justice
Douglas, in a dissenting opinion, argued that section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act expressed the congressional intent to leave
the enforcement of labor contracts to the parties themselves. He
stressed the policy of engaging the process of arbitration with the aid
of trained arbiters possessing special qualifications in a particular
industry and familiar with the common law of the shop.P
The Court's decision assures the continued effectiveness of section
8(d) of the NLRA 4 That section was enacted by Congress to prevent
employers from frustrating union bargaining efforts by refusing to
reduce to written form the terms of the agreement which had been
reached. After the Supreme Court in Heinz approved the Board's
requirement that employers sign contracts which have been agreed
upon, the Board further sought to discourage such refusals by
granting retroactive effect to the terms of the contract from the date
of agreement.5 The instant case is significant in authorizing the Board
to continue this practice, thus making clear to employers that a
delayed signing will not be allowed to frustrate the purposes of the
collective bargaining provisions in the NLRA. In Phelps Dodge the
Court interpreted section 10(c) as including the authority to fashion
appropriate remedies to make workers whole for losses suffered on
account of an unfair labor practice. The instant Court's decision, in
requiring the employer to make retroactive payments of fringe benefits
where he has committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to sign a
properly negotiated agreement, finds a new application for this rule
without extending the principle behind it. If section 10(c) did not
empower the Board to remedy such a past wrong done by an unfair
labor practice, the purpose of the statute could be completely avoided
by simply committing the unfair labor practice. The effectiveness of
section 8(d) is ultimately dependent upon the ability of the Board to
make a refusal to execute the agreement a pointless act. In Phelps
23. "What the 'common law' of the shop would show covering these fringe benefits, what
'past practices' might reflect on the amount of an award, what 'a fair solution' of the problem
might seem to be in an arbitration frame of reference, no one knows. These are matters for
arbiters, chosen by the parties under the collective agreement, not for the Board, an alien to the
system envisioned by Lincoln Mills." 393 U.S. at 366.
24. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
25. See cases cited note 22 supra.
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Dodge the Court recognized that Congress intended for the Board to
possess this ability' The dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas is without
support in law or in logic. In addition to his failure to recognize the
many cases distinguishing a mere contractual dispute from an unfair
labor practice case, he fails to deal with the question of why the guilty
employer should be allowed to require the union to submit to an
arbitration agreement which the employer has wrongfully refused to
acknowledge in writing as required by section 8(d) of the Act. 7 The
majority opinion is clearly correct and contributes a long-awaited
precedent for those who seek to effectuate the fundamental policy of
the Act-productive bargaining between labor and management.
Religious Societies-First Amendment Prohibits Civil Courts
From Determining Doctrinal Questions in Resolving Church
Property Disputes
A dispute arose between petitioner, Presbyterian Church in the
United States, and two local churches in Savannah, Georgia, over
control of church properties used by the local churches. In response to
various pronouncements and actions related to civil, economic, social
and political matters,' the local churches resolved that the general
church had departed from the faith and practice existing at the time
they affiliated with it2 and announced that henceforth they would
function autonomously. Claiming that the properties were held under
an implied trust for the use and benefit of those members adhering to
the doctrines and regulations of the general church, the petitioner
26. 313 U.S. at 194.
27. See 393 U.S. at 362.
I. The petitioners alleged that the general church had, among other things, ordained
women as ministers and elders, given its support to the removal of Bible readings from public
schools, and caused its members to remain in and accepted the leadership of the National
Council of Churches of Christ, which advocated the decline of parental authority, the practice of
civil disobedience and unwarranted intermeddling in civil affairs. The General Assembly's
adoption of a policy statement suggesting cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam as a
means to bring about unconditional negotiation and the endorsement of the civil rights
movement were among the activities cited as improper involvement in civil affairs.
2. The enumerated bases of faith and practice of the general church when formed in 1861
were: the Old and New Testaments of the Holy Bible, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and
the Larger and Shorter Catechisms. In particular, the local churches alleged the general church
had violated the provision in the Westminster Confession of Faith that states: "synods and
councils are to handle or conclude nothing but that which is ecclesiastical: and arc not to
[VOL. 22
RECENT CASES
undertook, by resolution of an Administrative Commission of the
Presbytery of Savannah, to fill offices that had been vacated at the
time the local churches withdrew from the general organization and to
provide ministerial leadership and regular services in the sanctuaries
of the local churches. Thereafter, injunctive relief was sought by the
local churches to prevent petitioner from interfering with their
exclusive use and control of the local properties. Petitioner contended
that the resolution of the Administrative Commission was in
accordance with the constitution and laws of the general church, that
under its presbyterian government, representative in form,3 the local
churches were subject to these provisions, and that when they failed to
appeal the decision it became final and binding on the parties and the
court. The trial court granted the local churches permanent
injunctions against acts of trespass by the general church. The
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed,4 concluding that the general church
had substantially abandoned the tenets of faith and practice existing
at the time of affiliation, thus entitling the local churches to the use
and possession of local church properties. On writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The departure-from-
doctrine element of the implied trust theory, insofar as it requires an
interpretation of church doctrines and the importance of those
doctrines to the religion, violates the first amendment command that
civil courts decide church property disputes without resolving
underlying controversies over religious doctrine and practice.
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
In Watson v. Jones5 the Supeme Court held on non-constitutional
intermeddle with civil affairs which concern the commonwealth unless by way of humble petition
in cases extraordinary; or by way of advice for satisfaction of conscience, if they be thereunto
required by the civil magistrate." ch. XXXIII, 4; "[i]t is the duty of the people to pray for
magistrates, io honor their persons, to pay them tribute and other dues, to obey their lawful
commands, and to be subject to their authority, for conscience' sake. Infidelity, or difference in
religion, doth not make void the magistrate's just and legal authority, nor free the people from
their due obedience to him; from which ecclesiastical persons are not exempted ...... ch.
XXV, 4.
3. The governmental hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church in the United States is
structured as follows: (1) the Session of each local church; (2) the Presbytery, which is composed
of several Sessions in a geographical area; (3) the Synod, which is composed of Presbyteries,
usually those within a state; and (4) the General Assembly. This organization also constitutes the
judicial system for the church.
4. 224 Ga. 61, 159 So. 2d 690 (1968).
5. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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grounds that decisions of the highest tribunal within a church having
a representative form of government are binding upon civil courts
where the rights of property7 are dependent upon questions of church
doctrine, ecclesiastical law or church government An exception to
this rule was recognized only in cases where there had been fraud,
collusion or arbitrariness, or where property had been devoted by
express terms to the use or support of some specific form of religious
doctrine. In these situations the Court was not bound by the decision
of such tribunals, but was under a duty to determine for itself whether
there has been a diversion of the property from its intended use. In
absence of an express trust, the narrow scope of the rule in Watson
restricted the review of a court to a determination of whether the church
tribunal in fact represented the supreme authority within the church
organization. When this was determined, the decisions of that tribunal
were binding on the court. Subsequent decisions suggested that the
rule in Watson might have constitutional status,10 though the case
itself had not been decided on such a ground.
In, contrast to this doctrine of abstention, Lord Eldon, in
Attorney General ex rel. Mander v. Pearson," committed the English
courts to a policy of involvement in the determination of questions of
religious doctrine where property rights were in issue. Under the
Pearson approach, where there are conflicting claims to church
property the court will determine any questions concerning church
doctrine and award the property to the group the court finds is loyal
to the faith and practice existing when the property was acquired.
2
6. Watson v. Jones was decided in 1871, before judicial recognition that the fourteenth
amendment incorporated first amendment limitations against state action.
7. For treatment'of property disputes in independent or congregational churches where the
conflict is between factions within a single church, see Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 297 (1967).
8. Watson v. Jones was the result of a conflict that developed within a local presbyterian
church in Louisville, Kentucky, over the question of slavery. In 1863, the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church adopted a resolution that required citizens from southern states to
declare their opposition to slavery if they desired to be missionaries or ministers. A small
minority in the church opposed the position of the General Assembly, seized the local church
property and proceeded to affiliate with the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States. The
basis of the minority claim to the property was that the resolution violated the provision of the
church constitution prohibiting the General Assembly from intermeddling in civil affairs.
9. Gonzales V. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
10. E.g., Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
11. 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (Ch. 1817).
12. Several years later Lord Eldon acknowledged the difficulty of attempting to solve
intricate questions of doctrine: "[T]hdre may be some doubt whether we understand the subject,
not only because the Court of Session was much more likely to understand the matter than we
are; but because I have had the mortification, I know not how many times over, to endeavour
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While a substantial number of decisions in state courts followed the
Watson position,'3 a number of decisions demonstrated a preference
for the Pearson approach. 4 In Landrith v. Hudgins,5 where property
rights depended upon the validity of particular acts of a church
organization, the court disregarded the determination of the
ecclesiastical court and made its own investigation to determine the
validity of the acts in light of the church constitution. The decision
was based on the theory, employed by other state courts as well," that
the constitution was a contract and that, therefore, the court was
under a duty to construe and enforce the agreement. 7 In other state
decisions judicial review of determinations by ecclesiastical tribunals
has been based upon an implied trust doctrine,'8 in which the courts
have undertaken to discover the intent of the donor at the time the
property was acquired by the church and thus to prevent a trust
diversion. 9 In an effort to avoid the difficulties of determining the
donor's intent, the court in Hughes v. Grossman20 awarded the
property to the group that followed the doctrine it determined had last
been accepted by the rival factions.
In the instant case the Court, after reviewing earlier decisions,21
myself to understand what these principles were. . . and I have made the attempt to understand
it, till I find it, at least, on my part to be quite hopeless . . . . [A]fter racking my mind again
and again upon the subject, I really do not know what more to make of it." Craigdallie v.
Aikman, 4 Eng. Rep. 435, 440-41 (H.L. 1820) (Scot.).
13. E.g., Saint John's Presbytery v. Central Presbyterian Church, 102 So. 2d 714, 719
(Fla. 1958).
14. E.g., Chatfield v. Dennington, 206 Ga. 762, 58 S.E.2d 842 (1950); Parker v. Harper,
295 Ky. 686, 175 S.W.2d 361 (1943); Landrith v. Hudgins, 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1907);
Beard v. Francis, 43 Tenn. App. 513, 309 S.W.2d 788 (1957).
15. 121 Tenn. 556, 120 S.W. 783 (1907).
16. E.g., Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 121 S.W. 805 (1909); Bear v. Heasley, 98 Mich.
279, 57 N.W. 270 (1893); Watson v. Garvin, 54 Mo. 353 (1873); Watson v. Avery, 65 Ky. (2
Bush) 332 (1867).
17. "The constitution is the contract of association in churches and . . . is binding upon
all portions of the church . . . .To pass upon the meaning of such [an] instrument is not
dealing with ecclesiastical questions at all, but only determining the meaning of an organic
agreement or contract." Boyles v. Roberts, 222 Mo. 613, 677, 121 S.W. 805, 821 (1909).
18. While the implied trust doctrine is still employed in most states, it is usually applied in
cases involving disputes in a congregational or independent church, where the authority rests with
the members of the congregation, rather than in the representative or presbyterian church, where
the authority is vested in a superior organization.
19. E.g., Horsman v. Allen, 129 Cal. 131, 61 P. 796 (1900); Kuns v. Robertson, 154 111.
394, 40 N.E. 343 (1895).
20. 166 Kan. 325, 201 P.2d 670 (1949).
21. The Court reviewed its holdings in Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190
(1960), Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), Gonzales v. Archbishop, 280
U.S. 1 (1929), and Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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concluded that the first amendment places severe restrictions on the
power of a civil court to interfere with the free exercise of religion.
Consequently, the Court reasoned, there are constitutional limitations
on the role of civil courts when disputes arise involving church
property; but the bare fact that church property is involved will not
prevent a civil court from deciding a controversy. The first
amendment, continued the Court, simply commands civil courts to
resolve disputes over church property without the interpretation and
weighing of particular church doctrine. The Georgia Supreme Court's
application of the implied trust and "departure-from-doctrine"
theories required it to determine whether actions of the petitioner
constituted a "substantial departure" from the fundamental religious
doctrine existing at the time the local churches became affiliated.
Such a determination, observed the Court, required (1) an
interpretation of the meaning of particular church doctrines, and, if a
substantial departure was found, (2) a determination of whether the
breach was so fundamental as to require termination of the implied
trust on which petitioner's rights rested. Consequently, the Court
concluded that the "departure-from-doctrine" element of the Georgia
implied trust theory, by involving the courts in these questions
concerning religious doctrine, went beyond the role allowed civil
courts by the first amendment in cases involving church property.
By the disposition of the instant case, the Court has sustained a
constitutional status for the doctrine announced in Watson" and has
taken from civil courts the power to decide controversies over church
property based on an interpretation of religious doctrine. Whether the
courts elected to proceed under a so-called contract theory, a doctrine
of implied trust, as in the instant case, or some similar label, the
holdings in this assemblage of decisions were fundamentally a
restatement of the policy of civil court involvement in matters of
religious doctrine enunciated in Pearson. The decision in the instant
case avoids a number of difficulties suggested by the policy of judicial
involvement. Meaningful freedom of religion necessarily includes the
right of a particular church to determine its own doctrine. Under the
policy enunciated in the instant case, the church is free to make such
a determination through the system of authority it has established for
itself and to decide questions of application of its doctrine to
22. The Court stated that Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)
converted the principle of Watson, as qualified by Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. I (1929),
into a constitutional rule.
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contemporary problems. Where a decision turns upon a question of
fact that properly would be left to a jury in a civil suit, as in the instant
case,2 the independence of a church is best guaranteed by leaving the
choice between reasonable alternatives to the constituted authority
within that particular faith rather than to those who represent the
general opinion of the community. Where the evidence involves a
controversial issue, as is often the case, or where the doctrine of the
church is not widely accepted in the community, determination of
such issues by civil courts presents a serious threat to independence
and to the right to adhere to an unpopular creed. The decision in the
instant case guarantees to any church, no matter how insignificant or
unpopular its position in the community, inviolability from the
restraints of public opinion.
Even aside from the constitutional difficulties recognized by the
Court, a contrary approach seems impractical. Where courts in the
past have attempted to determine the use to which property was
dedicated by finding a donor's unexpressed intent, 24 they have more
often than not been faced with the fact that the property was acquired
by an association, paid for by contributions collected from many
individuals over an extended period of time and enhanced in value and
maintained throughout subsequent years by countless others. 25 To
avoid the difficulties of such a determination, a routine solution was
the use of a fiction that church property was dedicated to the doctrine
existing at the time the property was acquired, the effect being to
burden subsequent donors who contributed to the purchase or
maintenance of the property with the supposed intent of those who
perhaps contributed but a fraction of the value.2 But whether this
determination was an answer to the question of a donor's intent, or
a resolution under a contract theory, the fact remains that
the court still faced the initial task of thrusting itself into
the nebulous area of ecclesiastical doctrine to decide questions, no
matter what they were labeled, that it was not equipped to answer.
Another effect of the decision in the instant case is a rejection of the
23. The jury was instructed to decide whether the actions of the general church "amount
to a fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the [general
church], so that the new tenents and doctrines are utterly variant from the purposes for which
the [general church] was founded." 393 U.S. at 443-44.
24. If the church property is held under an express trust for the use and benefit of a
particular doctrine, even under Watson the court will determine the questions involved.
25. See C. Zollmann, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW §§ 240, 250, 579 (1933).
26. Id.
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presumption that the church was intended to remain unaltered though
all the world around it might be changing. To so restrict the freedom
of the church would invite unacceptable consequences.2 1 It is
submitted that for the reasons suggested, the position taken in the
instant case is more consistent with the American tradition of
religious freedom and more likely to assure an equitable
determination of the rights to use of church properties.
Securities Regulation- Insurance Companies--Proxy Solici-
tation--McCarran-Ferguson Act not a Bar to Federal
Securities Laws
Alleging violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19341 and of rule lOb-5, 2 the SEC sought to enjoin3 the merger
of two stock life insurance companies on the grounds that the
defendant, National Securities, failed to disclose in the proxy
statements sent to shareholders of Producers Life that defendant
27. In an English case where the court found that a large majority had abandoned the
original faith and practice of the church, a minority of about 30 ministers was awarded church
property including 800 churches, three universities and over one million pounds. General
Assembly of Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, [1904] A.C. 515 (Scot.). This case was re-
versed by an Act of Parliament-Churches (Scotland) Act, 1905, 5 Edw. 7, ch. 12.
I. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964):
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange- ...
-(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968):
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
3. The SEC brought suit pursuant to § 21(e) of the Act, 48 Stat. 900, as anended, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964).
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owned control of both parties to the merger and that the surviving
company would assume obligations incurred in the purchase of the
defendant's interest in Producers Life Denial of temporary relief and
approval by the Arizona Director of Insurance resulted in the merger
of National Life and Casualty Insurance Company with Producers
Life Insurance Company to form National Producers Life Insurance
Company. Amending its complaint to seek additional relief, the SEC
sought court orders unwinding the merger and returning the situation
to the status quo ante. The Commission requested that defendants
account for their unlawful gains and that the court adjust the equities
of defendants and Producers Life on a fair and equitable basis,
including, if necessary, the subordination of National Securities's
interests in National Producers. Defendants argued that the
Commission's action was barred by section 2(b) of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act5 and moved for a judgment on the pleadings. The
United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, holding that the relief requested was either barred by the
McCarran Act or was beyond the scope of the Securities Exchange
Act.6 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on
the McCarran-Ferguson Act.7 On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. A shareholder's exchange of stock
after merger constitutes a "purchase or sale" within section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act, and the McCarran-
Ferguson Act does not preclude a suit by the SEC under the
Exchange Act to protect stockholders of an insurance corporation by
4. Defendant, National Securities, Inc., was a Colorado corporation doing business in
Arizona as a holding company. Defendant owned the controlling interest in the stock of
National Life & Casualty Insurance Co., an Arizona corporation. Control of Producers Life
Insurance Co. was purchased partly from Producers's directors and partly in the form of
treasury stock held by Producers. Defendants sought to obtain approval of a merger by sending
proxy statements to Producers's 14,000 stockholders. The assumption of the obligations by
Producers would have had the effect of Producers's financing Securities's purchase of control in
it.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964): "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance .. . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance ...-
Defendants contended that since the Arizona Director of Insurance had ruled that the merger
was not inequitable to the stockholders and not contrary to law, as he was required to do under
state insurance laws, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-731 (Supp. 1969), § 2(b) of the McCarran
Act barred the suit.
6. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 623 (D. Ariz. 1966).
7. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 387 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1967).
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unwinding a state-approved merger of insurance companies when
shareholder approval is procured by material misrepresentations. SEC
v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
In 1869, in Paul v. Virginia, the Supreme Court stated in dictum
that "[i]ssuing a policy of insurance [was] not a transaction of
commerce," but only a local transaction, governed by local law. The
case fathered numerous offspring, each adhering strictly to the
language of the leading -case, 0 and the rule that the business of
insurance was not commerce held sway through August of 1943, when
the District Court of Georgia sustained state control of the insurance
industry by quashing an indictment under the Sherman Antitrust
Act against the South-Eastern Underwriters Association." Pending
the appeal of South-Eastern Underwriters to the Supreme Court,
companion bills were introduced in both Houses of Congress to
exempt the business of insurance from the Sherman and Clayton
Antitrust Acts.12 The bills were still under consideration'3 when the
Supreme Court held insurance transactions subject to federal
regulation under the commerce clause. 4 The decision had an
immediate impact upon Congress, and even though a bill passed by
the House later died in the Senate, 5 congressional concern ultimately
resulted, in 1945, in passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,'"
providing that the "business of insurance," and every person engaged
in that business, would be subject to state laws which relate either to
8. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
9. Id. at 183.
10. E.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Bothwell v.
Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (1927); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231
U.S. 495 (1913); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900); Noble v. Mitchell,
164 U.S. 367 (1896); Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
11. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ga. 1943).
Judge Underwood commented that "[i]f there is to be any overruling of the long line of clear
and thoroughly considered decisions of the Supreme Court, acquiesced in for seventy-five years
by Congress and administrative agencies, it will have to be done by the Supreme Court itself, or
by Congress." Id. at 715.
12. S. 1362, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). See
Note, Insurance Under the Sherman Act, 32 GEO. L.J. 66 (1943).
13. Joint Hearings on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270 Before the Subconlns. oJ
the Comms. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., pts. 1-6 (1943.44).
14. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (4-3
decision).
15. Objection in the Senate killed the bill without a vote. 90 CONG. REC. 8054 (1944),
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964). The first section of the act clearly declared its policy:
"ITihe continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in
the public interest. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1964). The House Report, in its general statement,
said that "[t]he committee [had] therefore given immediate consideration to S. 340, together
[VOL. 22
1969] RECENT CASES
the regulation or the taxation of that business. 17 The Act specified that
no act of Congress would be construed so as to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any state law enacted to regulate or tax the business of
insurance, unless the act specifically related to insurance." Congress
placed a moratorium on the applicability of various federal statutes in
order to give the states time to enact legislation. 1" By enacting the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress indicated its approval of state
regulation and invited the states to deal, affirmatively with the
insurance business.2 0
Accepting this invitation, Arizona passed comprehensive acts to
deal broadly with the insurance industry.2' Although the legislative
with a similar measure, H.R. 1973, so that the several states [would] know that the Congress
desire[d] to protect the continued regulation and taxation of the business of insurance by the
several States, and thus [enable] insurance companies to comply with State laws." H.R. REP.
No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). To the same effect, see S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1945).
17. Senator McCarran (D-Nev.), co-author of the bill, noted that: "It is not required that
the assertion of State regulatory authority ...shall provide the most effective regulation
possible or that it shall be equally strict as the applicable federal law in the same field. Congress
has recognized the right of the States to apply their own public policy in the regulation of the
business of insurance." McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance, 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 541-42
(1948). Senator McCarran commented that there would only be two ways federal power could
be brought to bear upon the business of insurance: (1) through the enactment of new legislation,
or (2) through enforcement of the federal antitrust laws where there was no applicable state law.
As to the second possibility: "The sole question, with respect to any practice complained of, will
be whether that practice is regulated by State law. . . .The inquiry will be: 'Is this practice
regulated by State Law?'--not 'Is it effectively regulated?.' " Id. at 542.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1964). Senator Ferguson (R-Mich.), co-author of the bill, noted
that § 1012(b) of the Act was written in such a way as to make implied repeal of the act
impossible. No existing law or future law would be applied to the business of insurance unless
Congress specifically provided that the law would apply to insurance. 91 CONG. REC. 481, 1487
(1945).
19. The moratorium was initially to last until January 1, 1948, but was later extended to
June 30, 1948. If the states had not acted by that time, the federal laws would have been
enforced. The statutes affected were the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1013
(1964). Section 1014 listed three statutes that would be unaffected by the Act. The Court of
Appeals in the instant case found it significant that Congress named acts which it felt would
otherwise have fallen within the exemption. 387 F.2d at 30 (1967). There is no mention of the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012(b), 1013, 1014 (1964). According to Senator O'Mahoney (D-Wyo.);
"In drafting [the McCarran Act] we sought to spell out each particular law which might apply
to insurance. . . .In other words, a good faith attempt was made to specify every single law
which had an application, or might have an application, to insurance." 91 CONG. REc. 483
(1945).
20. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429, 431 (1946); McCarran, supra
note 17, at 540.
21. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-441 et. seq. (1956).
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history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act offers no definition of the
phrase "business of insurance," Congress' primary concerns seem to
have been the relationship between insurance rate-making and the
antitrust laws and the power of the states to tax insurance
companies.2 2 As part of its regulation of the insurance business,
Arizona,2 3 like at least thirty other states,2  regulates insurance
company mergers. The Arizona statute provides that no merger or
consolidation shall be consummated without the written approval of
the Director of Insurance. The approval will be given unless the
Director finds the merger contrary to law, inequitable to the
stockholders, or tending to reduce substantially the security of and
services rendered to the policyholders.25 In response to the 1964
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act,2  Arizona law also gives
the Director of Insurance the power to determine whether a full
disclosure of relevant facts has occurred in connection with the
solicitation of proxies. 27 The question thus remains whether the
22. See, e.g., 91 CONG. REC. 1087-88 (1945) (remarks of Congressmen Hancock and
Celler). The committee reports are unilluminating. See H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1945); S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
23. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-731 (Supp. 1969), 20-733 (1956).
24. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4245, 664246 (1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 628.451
(Supp. 1969), 628.471 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 41-2856, 41-2857 (1961); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 304.952 (1963); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 40-4745, 40-4746 (1961); WASH. REV.
CODES ANN: § 48.31.010 (1961). For merger procedure and its approval by public supervisory
authority, see ABA SUBCOMM. OF THE PUBLIC REG. OF THE Bus. OF INS. COMM. OF TIlE
SECTION OF INS., NEGL., AND COmP. LAW, MERGER OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 137-65
(1966).
25. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-731(B) (Supp. 1969).
26. Pub. L. 88467, 78 Stat. 565 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 15
U.S.C. § 731(g)(2)(G) (1964), provides that the registration requirements for securities shall not
apply in respect of:
"(G) any security issued by an insurance company if all of the following conditions are
met:
"'(i) Such insurance company is required to and does file an annual statement with the
Commissioner of Insurance (or other officer or agency performing a similar function) of its
domiciliary State, and such annual statement conforms to that prescribed by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners or in the determination of such State commissioner,
officer or agency substantially conforms to that so prescribed.
"(ii) Such insurance company is subject to regulation by its domiciliary State of proxies,
consents, or authorizations in respect of securities issued by such company and such regulation
conforms to that prescribed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
"(iii) After July 1, 1966, the purchase and sales of securities issued by such insurance
company by beneficial owners, directors, or officers of such company are subject to regulation
(including reporting) by its domiciliary State substantially in the manner provided in section 78p
of this title."




McCarran-Ferguson Act's sanction of state insurance regulation was
intended to include securities regulation. The Supreme Court rejected
an argument based on the McCarran-Ferguson Act in SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC),28 holding that adequate
state regulation would not bar federal regulation of variable annuity
contracts where their essential character is that of securities rather
than insurance. Following VALIC, the Court held in SEC v. United
Benefit Life Insurance Co. 2 1 that certain annuity contracts issued by
insurance companies could not be offered to the public without conform-
ing to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.
At the outset the Court addressed itself to the question of what
Congress had intended when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
allowing the states to regulate the "business of insurance." The Court
concluded that the focus of that statutory phrase was on the relationship
between the insurance company and the policyholder in the contract of
insurance Statutes aimed at that relationship, directly or in-
directly, are laws regulating the "business of insurance." However, the
Court noted, at least part of the Arizona statute& was not aimed at the
"insurance" relationship, but instead focused on protection of in-
surance company stockholders and, as such, was not within the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Acknowledging that Arizona
law requires the Director of Insurance to find that a proposed merger
will not substantially reduce the security of or services rendered to
policyholders before he can approve the merger,32 the Court noted that
although this clearly relates to the business of insurance, in the
circumstances of this particular case the McCarran-Ferguson Act will
not bar a federal remedy which affects a matter subject to state
insurance regulation 3 The Court reasoned that the Commission did
28. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
29. 387 U.S. 202 (1967).
30. The Court reasoned that under Paul v. Virginia (see text accompanying notes 8-11
supra) the states had freedom in regulating the dealings between insurers and their policyholders.
When South-Eastern Underwriters threatened continued state control, Congress attempted to
turn back the clock. The House Report, H.R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945),
makes it clear that Congress did not intend "to clothe the States with any power to regulate or
tax the business of insurance beyond that which they had been held to possess prior to the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Southeastern Underwriters Association
case." Congressional concern was with state regulation dealing with the contract of insurance,
the transaction Paul v. Virginia had held was not commerce. 393 U.S. at 459.
31. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-731(B)(2) (Supp. 1969).
32. Id. § 20-731(B)(3) (Supp. 1969).
33. The Court would not intimate any opinion about what remedies might be appropriate,
holding only that there was no reason to refuse the remedies sought by the Commission. 393
U.S. at 462. The Court declined to express any opinion on the district court's holding that
1969]
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not ask the trial court to pass directly upon the merger approved by
the Director of Insurance; instead, the gravamen of the complaint
related to misrepresentation to stockholders, and as such was
unrelated to state approval based on adequate protection of
policyholders. Thus Arizona's interest in protecting policyholders
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act is not infringed upon by the para-
mount federal interest in insuring "that insurance companies speak the
truth when talking to their shareholders."
3'
Because a simple remand of the case from the pretrial dismissal
of the complaint would leave several issues unresolved, the Court
found it desirable to dispose of two remaining issues before remanding
the case3 In response to the contention that the complaint failed to
allege a "purchase or sale" of securities within the meaning of section
10(b), the Court rejected the applicability of the "no-sale doctrine"3
and determined that in the context of section 10(b)37 the broad anti-
fraud purposes of the statute and the rule would be furthered by
finding that shareholders had "purchased" shares in the new
company by exchanging them for their old stock .3  The Court
similarly rejected the contention that rule lOb-5 does not cover proxy
some of the relief requested was beyond the scope of § 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 900, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964). 393 U.S. at 462 n.5. See SEC v. Na-
tional Sec., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 623, 626 (D. Ariz. 1966).
34. 393 U.S. at 463.
35. Mr. Justice Harlan, although agreeing with the Court's construction of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, said that he was at a loss to understand why the Court found it necessary to go
further, since the court of appeals reached no further questions and the government's petition for
certiorari was limited to the sole issue of "whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act ...precludes
the application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." In fact the
Solicitor General believed the further questions were not appropriately before the Court. 393
U.S. at 470. Mr. Justice Black dissented, believing the court of appeals correctly decided the
case.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1968). That rule the Court points out is specifically made
applicable only to cases involving § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, and sets forth various
situations involving statutory mergers and other types of corporate reorganization, declaring
that no "sale" or "offer" shall be deemed to be involved. 393 U.S. at 466.
37. Even when there is interdependence of various sections of the securities laws, the
meaning of particular phrases must be determined in context. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 32 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
38. By voting in favor of the merger an approving shareholder lost any right under
Arizona law to obtain an appraisal of his stock and payment for it in cash. This, the Court
said, affected the shareholder in ways not at all unlike a typical cash sale or share exchange.
393 U.S. at 467. The governing Arizona statute, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-347 (1956),
provides in part: "Any shareholder of the corporations consolidating who votes to reject the
agreement, and who does not consent to the agreed manner of converting the shares of stock,
shall be paid in cash the fair value of stock."
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solicitations. Although section 14 of the Securities Act of 193431 and
the rules adopted pursuant to that section set up a regulatory scheme
for proxy solicitation, that fact, in and of itself, did not affect the
scope of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and was thus no bar to their
application in the instant case.!'
The Supreme Court has decided that the federal policy of
allowing state regulation of the "business of insurance," as codified
in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, is limited to state regulation of the
insurance company-policyholder relationship, while the insurance
company-stockholder relationship is not immune to federal
regulation.42 A more difficult question arises in the Court's refusal to
limit itself to the issue raised by the Government in its petition for
certiorari, and its entrance into "virgin territory," albeit cautiously,
to construe section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Although clearly dictum, the
Court concluded that the contention that rule lOb-5 does not cover
misrepresentations occuring in connection with proxy solicitations
could be dismissed "rather quickly." But in disposing of the issue in
one paragraph, the Court ignores the Securities Exchange Act
Amendments of 1964, which exempt insurance companies from 1934
Act registration and hence from the proxy provisions.44 By these
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1964).
40. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-I to 240.14a-103 (1968). The acts complained of would have
fallen within the prohibitions and rules of the proxy-solicitation, anti-fraud provision of § 14 of
the 1934 Act, supra note 39, but for the fact that the stock of the insurance companies had
never been registered on a national securities exchange. By virtue of the 1964 Amendments to
the Securities Act, coverage under § 14 was extended to corporations similarly situated to the
insurance companies in this action. This coverage is conditioned on an exemption for all
insurance companiies subject to certain defined state regulation. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(2)(G) (1964).
41. The Court distinguished the concededly overlapping effects of the two sections by
noting that § 10(b) applies to all proscribed conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a
security, while § 14 applies to all proxy solicitations, whether or not in connection with a
purchase or sale.
42. This conclusion was reached at an earlier date by Congress: "Stock insurance
companies are presently subject to the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934." S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1963). "Insurance
companies' securities are not exempt from the Securities Act or the Exchange Act .. . State
regulation of insurance companies is directed to the protection of the holders of insurance
policies, not investors in insurance company securities, as to whom the State regulation has been
described as 'less and less meaningful' when matched against the 'more and more relevant'
disclosure policy of the Securities Act." REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 3,
40 (1963).
43. 393 U.S. at 468.
44. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE l0b-5, § 6.5(1), 136 n.92(3)
(1968). H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964): "The securities of stock insurance
19691
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amendments Congress expressly relinquished its supervision of the
area, giving state insurance commissioners an opportunity to
demonstrate their ability to protect investors as well as
policyholders!' It was pursuant to the 1964 amendments that Arizona
granted the Director of Insurance the power to make regulations
concerning proxies for companies not having registered securities.
Further, since the federal amendment and state laws both became
effective in 1966, after the instant case first appeared in the courts, it
is highly questionable whether section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 should be
construed now in such a way as to provide federal regulation in an
area Congress believed it had expressly exempted' In rebuttal, it may
be argued that what Congress relinquished, knowingly or otherwise,
was merely its "regulation" of the area, 7 and that it had no intention
of depriving an aggrieved party or the SEC of any implied action
under the proxy rules" and rule lOb-5. Rule lOb-5 could then be
directed against insurance company proxies to provide a remedy that
would otherwise be lacking 9
The questions then arise as to what standard should apply and
what conduct should constitute violation of rule lOb-5. Nothing
succeeds like success, and with each successful application of rule lOb-
5, its use increasesY0 The absence of standards to be applied in using
companies may become exempt if under State law or regulation there are comparable
requirements as to information, proxy solicitation, and insider short-term trading."
45. During the hearings on the amendments, witnesses objected to federal regulation on
jurisdictional grounds, rather than grounds relating to the protection of investors: "[Tlhese
witnesses opposed departure by the bill from the doctrine embodied in the McCarran Act that
the regulation of insurance companies be left to the States." The committee adopted the
exemption following the testimony of a number of state insurance commissioners and
representatives of stock insurance companies. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1964).
46. Relevant portions of the 1964 amendments are quoted in note 26 supra.
47. See note 26 supra for the language of the exemption, noting that the insurance
companies will be subject to regulation, Le., administrative supervision and specification of
contents, instead of remedies. A. BROMBERG, supra note 44.
48. SEC Rule 14a-9(a), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9(a) (1968), provides that: "[N]o solicitation
subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy statement. . . or other communica-
tion, written br oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the
circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or
which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not
false or misieading." Compare this to rule lOb-5, note 2 supra. In J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964), the Court sustained a shareholder's implied right of action in a merger
allegedly based on violation of the proxy rules.
49. There is no express provision of relief for misleading statements in proxies of
unregistered companies; a registered company whose proxies must be filed with the SEC is
subject to the remedies of § 18 of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78(r) (1964).
50. Neil Kennedy commented that: "I think lOb-5 maybe has put a lot of fun in it for the
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rule lOb-5 would seem to the purist an invitation for its supplantation
of the Securities Acts 5 Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion,
noted that the courts and commentators have vigorously debated
whether rule lOb-5 should be read as a sweeping prohibition against
fraud that will absorb more limited liability provisions, thus rendering
them a nullity, and he suggested that the issues involved are far too
important to decide without a full argument by both sides 2 It is
submitted that the Court should not so readily give rule lOb-5 the
qualities of a dry sponge, ready to absorb express statutory provisions
in which Congress has detailed specific requirements for burdens of
proof, defenses, and statutes of limitation 5 3 The ultimate effect of the
Court's construction of the rule will become evident only with the
passage of time, but certainly those who argued for a broad
application should look forward to further satisfaction from the
courts.
The Court also found it necessary to deal with the meaning of
the phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"
found in rule lOb-5. Many of the cases dealing with this phrase have
dealt with questions of standing under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp:4  was interpreted to mean
that only a person defrauded in connection with his own "purchase"
or "sale" could take advantage of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5; but
the demise of the Birnbaum doctrine has accelerated during the last
few years,5 and this trend has been applauded.' The instant case,
investigators because almost whatever happens they can come up with a theory that lOb-5 has
somehow been violated." Panel Discussion, The Emergence of "'Federal Corporation Law" and
Federal Control of Inside Information, 34 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 228, 229 (1966).
51. An obvious solution would be to rewrite rule lOb-5 or § 10(b) of the Exchange Act of
1934. The SEC has authority to change the rule, but it would seem unlikely that it would care
to limit its regulatory or disciplinary authority. Congressional action raises questions concern-
ing the desirability of codifying the developments under the rule without simply creating a host
of new problems.
52. 393 U.S. at 472.
53. Professor Bromberg analogizes the absorption process to "that by which the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment seems to be absorbing the Bill of Rights and
applying it to the states." A. BROMBERG, supra note 44, at § 2.5, 41 (1968). Another writer sees
less practicability in the developments under rule lOb-5: "What lies ahead under rule lOb-5? The
only prospect which I can see in all candor, is--More chaos. . . . [Plerhaps each lawyer should
consider equipping his client with a shoe-phone, so that he can be in touch with him day and
night to combat the forces of Kaos." Marsh, What Lies Ahead Under Rule lOb-5?, 24 Bus.
LAW. 69, 75-76 (1968).
54. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
55. Lowenfels, The Demise of the "'Birnbaum' Doctrine: A New Era for Rule lOb-5, 54
VA. L. REV. 268, 271-75 (1968).
56. Id.; Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule lOb-5 53 CORNELL L.
REV. 684, 694-97 (1968).
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however, involves none of the standing questions, but instead relates
only to the scope of the statutory coverage. The Court's conclusion
that shareholders "purchase" shares in a new company by exchanging
them for their old stock seems substantially correct, and however far
it broadens the definition of "purchase" or "sale," it does no
violence to the language of the rule,57 since such a construction
provides needed stockholder protection in a time of increasing
mergers.
Securities Regulation-Punitive Damages Awarded in Action
Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, While
Underwriter's Indemnification Agreement Held Void as Against
Public Policy Where Underwriter Knows of Material Inaccuracy
in Offering Circular
Thirteen purchasers of newly issued common stock charged
defendant corporation, two of its officers,' and an investment banking
firm with violations of the federal securities laws2 and common-law
57. Note, however, that although few will argue with the Court's decision on this question,
it should be considered dictum, since the issue was not raised for formal argument.
I. Elias Hoppenfeld, the president of defendant Law Research Service, Inc., was named a
defendant in the original complaint. Paul Weiner, treasurer and director of the corporation, was
named a third party defendant in a cross-claim filed also against Hoppenfeld and the
corporation by Blair & Co., the underwriter.
2. Hoppenfeld and Blair & Co. were charged with violations of § 17(a) of the Securities
Act of 1933, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and common-law fraud. In
addition, Blair & Co. was charged with violations of § 12(2) of the 1933 Act and § 15(c) of the
1934 Act.
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964), provides: 'It shall be
unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . directly or indirectly
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or any property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964), provides: "it
shall be unlawful for any person . ..
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on
-a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of-such rules and regulations as the Commission may




fraud,3 d ue to the alleged omission of material facts4 from certain
sales literature required by the Securities and Exchange Commission.5
The underwriter asserted a cross-claim against the issuing corporation
and its officers based on an idemnification agreement,6 despite the
fact that the underwriter had knowledge of the alleged material
omission in the circular. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs on all counts of federal securities acts violations, but
acquitted the defendants on the common-law fraud count. The jury
also awarded punitive damages against the investment banking firm
and the issuing corporation's president under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933. 7 At the same time, the jury granted the
underwriter indemnification from the issuer and its president. On a
motion to the district court by the corporation and its officers to
dismiss the cross-claim, to set aside the verdict and for judgment
n.o.v., held, cross-claim dismissed. Punitive damages may be awarded
under section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 for conduct contrary
to the public interest involving a high degree of moral culpability, and
enforcement of the indemnification agreement would contravene the
public policy embodied in the federal securities acts. Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77/ (1964), provides for the return of the price
paid by one who sells a securitywith misleading statements less the amount of the income
earned on the security.
Section 15(c) of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (9)(c)(1) (1964), provides: "No
broker or dealer shall ... induce the purchase or sale of any security . .. by means of
manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance."
3. For a discussion of common-law fraud, see W. PROSSER, TORTS § 100 (3d ed. 1964).
4. Defendant Law Research Service, Inc., had been engaged in a law information retrieval
system using the computers and programming services of the Univac Division of Sperry-Rand
Corp. The offering circular, which bore the name of Blair & Co. as underwriters, prominently men-
tioned the "Sperry-Rand Contract" and indicated that Sperry-Rand was contributing to the suc-
cess of the venture. In fact, the contract had been terminated, and the matter was presently in
litigation. As a consequence, no services were being provided by Sperry-Rand, a fact apparently
known by all defendants.
5. The information was omitted from the offering circular, which is required by
Regulation A, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964). The Commission is authorized to exempt from registration offerings
of less than $300,000 "if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such
securities is not in the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1964). In such unregistered offerings, the
offering circular performs a function similar to that of a prospectus in the case of a registered sec-
urity. SeeSEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (1968).
6. Law Research was to indemnify Blair & Co. for any loss arising out of untrue
statements of a material fact in the offering circular, unless the underwriters were guilty of a
.willful misfeasance, bad faith or gross negligence in the performance of their duties or recklessly
disregarded their obligations and duties under the underwriting agreement.
7. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964). See note 2 supra.
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Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act8 declares unlawful the
making of an untrue statement or the omission of a material fact
which would mislead the investor. Unlike common-law fraud, where
both a specific intent to defraud and a justifiable reliance on the
fraudulent misrepresentation must be shown,'0 the plaintiff in a
section 17(a) case must show only the deftndant's actual knowledge of
the statement's falsity and the materiality of the inaccuracy." In
common-law fraud cases it is generally recognized that punitive
damages, in addition to compensatory damages, are recoverable in
order to deter12 acts which amount to gross fraud13 or a reckless
indifference to the rights of others. 4 Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act,
which limits damages to "actual damages complained of,"' 5 has been
said to exclude punitive damages. Since there is no limitation similar
to section 28(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act in the 1933 Act, one court
has said in dictum that punitive damages are appropriate for a claim
based on section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 7
Mutual indemnification agreements are inserted in prospectuses
or offering circulars as a matter of form. 8 In the typical agreement
8. See note 2 supra.
9. A material fact is one "which if it had been stated or disclosed would have deterred or
tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities in question." Charles
A. Howard, I S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934); cJ. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 I-.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
10. For a discussion of common-law fraud, see W. PROSSER, TORTS § 100 (3d ed. 1964).
II. See. e.g., Dack v. Shanman, 227 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (count lacking
allegations necessary to action in fraud and deceit sufficient for cause of action under securities
acts); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (fraud need not be shown; mere misstatement
sufficient). For cases and articles supporting various views on the amount of knowledge required
for securities fraud, see Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
12. The use of punitive damages as a deterrent factor is discussed in Walker v. Sheldon,
10 N.Y.2d 401, 406, 179 N.E. 2d 497, 499, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (1961).
13. E.g., Greene v. Keithly, 86 F.2d 238, 242 n. I (8th Cir. 1936).
14. In Fink v. Boyer, 331 Mo. 1242, 56 S.W.2d 372 (1932), the court held that where the
fraudulent act was done without just cause or excuse, punitive damages may be awarded, An
Indiana court extended this idea to negligent misrepresentations where the seller could have
discovered the truth. Wheatcraft v. Myers, 57 Ind. App. 371, 107 N.E. 81 (1914).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1964); See generally 3 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1793 (1961); Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities A ct, 43
YALE L.J. 227 (1933); Comment, Private Remedies Available Under lob-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620,
623 (1966).
16. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 769-70 (D.N.J. 1955) (dictum).
17. Nagel v. Prescott, 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
18. For an example and discussion of the standard form, see Lockwood & Anderson,
Underwriter Contracts, Within Purview of Securities Act ol 1933: With Certain Suggested
Provisions, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 33 (1939).
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each of the parties agrees to indemnify the other for any loss that
may occur because of a material inaccuracy within the indemnitor's
sphere of expertise. 9 The federal securities laws do not deal directly
with indemnification agreements,'20 but a policy expression in SEC
Rule 460 indicates that the Commission views indemnity agreements
which favor directors, officers and controlling persons as against public
policy in that they contradict the deterrent purpose of the imposition
of liability."'
In the instant case, the court indicated that the standard to be
applied in awarding punitive damages is whether the defendants'
conduct involved a high degree of moral culpability; the test does not
include the technical requirements of common-law fraudV2 The court
found that there was ample evidence to support the finding that the
underwriter had actual knowledge of the material facts omitted from
the offering circular and, therefore, the underwriter was guilty of
deliberate wrongdoing in distributing the circular without revealing
those facts. Although the liability arose from a violation of a statute
which did not expressly allow punitive damages, the court argued that
this did not prevent it from sustaining such an award. It noted other
applications of punitive damages to implied civil liability arising from
legislative authority3 and pointed out that the award complemented
the purpose of the antifraud provision of the 1933 Act. Further, the
court reasoned that if Congress had wished to impose a restriction
against punitive damages in the 1933 Act as it did in the 1934
Act, it would have done so. The court added that the plaintiffs had
not forfeited their rights to punitive damages under the 1933 Act by
asserting an action under 10(b) of the 1934 Act, since section 28(a) of
the 1934 Act provides that the remedies in that Act are cumulative
rather than exclusive. Even though the jury's verdict did not designate
whether section 17(a) of the 1933 Act or section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
had been violated, the court upheld the punitive damages award
19. For a discussion of the extent of fiduciary responsibility of underwriters, accountants,
lawyers and directors, see Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Note, 7he Underwriter's Duty of 'Due Diligence" Under Section I oJ the Securities Act:
Reflections on BarChris. 22 'AND. L. REv. 386 (1969).
20. Section 14 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77n (1964), does, however, void any provision
binding any purchaser to waive compliance with either the Act or SEC rules.
.21. SEC Rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 Note (1968). See argument and cases cited in
Note, Indennification oJ Underwriters and Section 11 oJ the Securities Act oJ 1933, 72 YALE
L.J. 406, 408-10 (1962); see also Chabot v. Empire Trust Co., 301 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1962).
22. See text accompanying notes 9-17 supra.
23. 287 F. Supp. at 194.
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because the elements of a violation under either section are the same.
Furthermore, the court found that intent to deceive was not an
element of securities fraud, since Congress could have used "time
honored classic phrases" to describe the concept, but instead chose
words referring primarily to conduct. In addition, the court reasoned
that intent to defraud is not required for criminal penalties;
consequently, to require a civil plaintiff to prove intent to defraud
would be an anomalous result. Finally, the court ruled that the
defendants were estopped from asserting that the omission had not
caused plaintiffs' damage, since the parties had previously agreed on
the amount of damages in the event that a court determined that
defendants had violated the federal securities laws.
The court held that in the situation where the underwriter has
actual knowledge of the material inaccuracy in the offering circular,
the indemnification agreement is void as against public policy. The
threat of liability is imposed to encourage thorough investigation and
truthfulness in the prospectus, and the court refused to frustrate that
purpose by allowing the underwriter to escape liability through
indemnification. Despite the fact that the corporation's officers were
"more guilty" than the underwriter, the court denied recovery under
the indemnification agreement because the underwriter had not
performed its duties with due care.2' By awarding punitive damages
under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act ' and striking the indemnity
clause, the court has significantly strengthened the powerful weapon
of private enforcement of the federal securities laws. Private
enforcement is a necessity, since the SEC presently does not have the
resource capability for adequate investigation of registration
statements. 26 Thefear of litigation and the possibility of prohibitive
damages without indemnification encourage caution and diligence in
the investigation and preparation of the prospectus. Without this fear,
underwriters have had little impetus to thoroughness in their
investigations. The court thus properly struck the indemnification
agreement in the situation where the underwriter has actual knowledge
24. For a discussion of the relationship of indemnification to the underwriter's duty of
care, see Note, The Underwriter's Duty oJ "'Due Diligence" Under Section II oj the Securities
Act: Reflections on BarChris, 22 VAND. L. REV. 386 (1969).
25. Although § 17(a) of the 1933 Act applies only to fraudulent sales, its wording is
substantially the same as SEC Rule lOb-5, which deals with both purchases and sales;
consequently, it is possible that actions for fraudulent sales formerly brought under lob-5 will
now be based on § 17(a) because of the chance for greater damages. See text accompanying
note 15 supra.
26. Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUt,. L. REV. 1411, 1421 (1968).
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of material inaccuracy. However, since the court could have reached
the same conclusion throughi interpretation of the indemnification
agreement 27 but chose instead to strike the agreement, there is an
indication that liability without indemnity could be extended to
negligent omission or misstatement. It is submitted that such an
extension would be in the public interest. In the securities field, tle
underwriters, as much as the corporate officers, bear a fiduciary
responsibility to the investing public. By definition, an underwriter
negligent in his investigation and representations has not acted as a
reasonably prudent man; consequently, he should be held accountable.
However, the standard of conduct appropriate for the reasonably
prudent underwriter is just as uncertain as the amount of damages to
be paid if a court decides that the standard has been violated. While
the courts of the Southern District of New York have a great deal of
experience and acumen in the securities area and are probably
eminently qualified to fashion judicial guidelines, other districts are
not necessarily so favored. Hence, with the forseeable increase in
litigation due to the possibility of punitive damages, there is a distinct
chance for inequitable variation not only in the amount of damages
awarded, but also in the standard of conduct demanded.2 8 It is
submitted that only a definite congressional statement or appropriate
SEC rules can provide both protection to the investor and certainty to
the businessman. For example, the treble damage provision of the
Clayton Actf2 has proved to be an effective means of enforcing the
antitrust laws while awarding damages to injured parties. A similar
provision in the securities laws could eliminate possible inequitable
variation in damages awards. The decision in the instant case was
predictable and is of great value in the enforcement of securities laws.
However, in view of the threat of liability and the present imbroglio
under SEC rule lOb-5, it clearly demonstrates the need for guidelines
promulgated either by Congress or by the SEC in order to channel
the rapid development in this area of law.
27. See note 6 supra.
28. In Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), punitive
damages were disallowed as to misleading statements regarding the use of a drug made by a
drug company. The court commented to the effect that if punitive damages were allowed, the
multiplicity of suits in many jurisdictions could aggregate the amount of damages awarded far
beyond the amount necessary for "punishment," resulting in "overkill."
29. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964), reads in pertinent part: "Any person . . .
injured . . . by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue in district court ...




Taxation-Accumulated Earnings Tax- Corporation Must Show
Absence of Tax Avoidance Motives as One Purpose for
Unreasonable Accumulation
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed accumulated
earnings taxes' against respondent, a small, closely held corporation.2
The taxes were paid, and when a claim for a refund was refused, a
suit for recovery was initiated. At the conclusion of the trial, the court
rejected the Government's requested instruction which would have
permitted the jury to find for the Commissioner if tax avoidance was
found to be a purpose for respondent's accumulation." Instead, the
court instructed the jury to find for respondent unless tax avoidance
was "the purpose" for the accumulation. The jury returned a special
verdict indicating that although respondent's accumulation was
beyond the reasonable needs of his business, tax avoidance was not
"the purpose." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed,
but upheld the trial court's rejection of the Government's proposed
instruction, holding that the accumulated earnings tax applied only if
tax avoidance was the "dominant, controlling, or impelling motive"
for the accumulation.! On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. In order to rebut the statutory presumption of
tax avoidance created by section 533(a), a corporation must show by
I. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37. Section 531 sets the rates and imposes the
tax. Section 532(a) provides that the tax is to be imposed on "every corporation . . . formed or
availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders or the
shareholders of any other corporation, by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead
of being divided or distributed." Subsection (b) exempts personal holding companies, foreign
personal holding companies, and tax-exempt corporations under subchapter I-. Section 533(a)
provides that: 'T]he fact that the earnings and profits . . . accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect
to shareholders, unless the corporation by the preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the
contrary."
2. These sections are generally applied only to small, closely held corporations. See S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954). The basic purpose of §§ 531-37 is to discourage
the use of a corporation as an accumulation vehicle to shelter its individual stockholders from
personal income tax rates. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL lNcoME TAXATION 01-
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 211 (2d ed. 1966). Only one large corporation has been
subjected to the accumulated earnings tax, but in that case the controlling interest was held by a
small group of shareholders. See Trico Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied. 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
3. Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1967): "[Ilt is not necessary
that avoidance of shareholder's tax be the sole purpose for the unreasonable accumulation of
earnings; it is sufficient if it is one of the purposes for the company's accumulation policy."
4. Id. at 298.
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a preponderance of evidence that the avoidance of taxes on its
shareholders was not one of the purposes of the accumulation. United
States v. Donruss Company, 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
The accumulated earnings tax is applied to "every corporation
• . . formed or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax
with respect to its shareholders." 5 Under the 1939 Code, the ultimate
question was not whether the corporation had business needs for
which accumulations were made, but whether it was formed or availed
of for the proscribed purpose.' The tax was held applicable where a
corporation made reasonable accumulations for business purposes but
was also motivated by tax avoidance.7 The provision in the 1954 Code
for a tax credit against all reasonable accumulations now makes the
question of intent irrelevant if the accumulations are reasonable.8 On
the other hand, corporations making unreasonable accumulations
have not been subjected to the tax where there existed an honest belief
of the need to accumulate. There has been some conflict as to the
quantum of proof required to rebut the presumption which arises
when accumulations are found to be unreasonable in light of planned
or anticipated business needs. The First Circuit held in Young Motor
Co. v. Commissioner"° that the taxpayer need only show that tax
avoidance was not the "primary or dominant purpose which led to
the decision," since "the statute does not say 'a' purpose, but 'the'
purpose."' t The same result has been reached in other decisions by
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 532.
6. Young Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488, 490-91 (Ist Cir. 1960); B. BIrrKER
& J. EUSTICE. .upra note 2, at 218.
7. E.g., Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958); Whitney
Chain & Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1945)Z United States v. R.C. Tway
Coal Sales Co., 75 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1935). Where an accumulation was originally for
legitimate purposes but was later motivated by tax avoidance, the tax is imposed. Helvering v.
Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693 (1943).
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 535(c)(I)(A): -[T]he accumulated earnings credit is . . . an
amount equal to such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable year as are retained for the
reasonable needs of the business."
9. E.g., United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964); T.C.
Heyward & Co. v. United States, (W.D.N.C. 1966), cited in 18 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5775;
Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965). Since "purpose" is the ultimate question,
the tax should not be imposed where accumulations are made out of spite, caprice, miserliness or
stupidity rather than good business reasons. B. BirTKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note 2, at 216. L.g.
T.C. Heyward & Co. v. United States, supra, where the court found the accumulations to be
"fantastic" but held for the taxpayer, 'noting that "one bent upon tax evasion would [not] have
the unmitigated gall to attempt it in such an obvious manner." Id. at 5775. C(Y. Smoot Sand &
Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1960) (reasonable purpose required).
10. 281 F.2d 488 (Ist Cir. 1960). See also Apollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d
867 (Ist Cir. 1966).
II. 281 F.2d at 491.
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analogy to certain provisions of the Code dealing with estate and gift
taxes . 2 However, the "dominant purpose" approach has been flatly
rejected in some jurisdictions which have dealt with the problem, 3
while others have approved the imposition of the tax if tax avoidance
was one of the "determinating purposes."'" In these jurisdictions the
"[taxpayer's] evidence must be directed to [showing] a complete lack
of the proscribed purpose.''15
After determining that the phrase "availed of for the purpose"
was inherently vague, 6 the instant Court examined the legislative
history of the accumulated earnings provisions and concluded that
Congress had not placed any particular significance on the use of the
article "the.' 't7 Instead, congressional policy was seen as favoring the
distribution of corporate profits not needed for business purposes so
that, when distributed, additional tax liability would be imposed on
stockholders. 8 The Court noted that this policy has been implemented
12. For example, although the words of § 2035(a) of the Code do not specify that
impending death must be the dominant or controlling factor behind the transfer, courts have
consistently so held. E.g., Allen v. Trust Company of Georgia, 326 U.S. 630 (1946); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1945); United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102
(1931). Section 102 of the Code does not specify that the donor's dominant intent must be
donative; however that intent must be shown if the transfer is to be treated as a gift.
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
13. E.g., United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964); Barrow
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied. 369 U.S. 817 (1962);
Trico Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
14. E.g., Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); World
Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied. 335 U.S. 911
(1949).
15. Pelton Steel Casting Co., 28 T.C. 153, 174 (1957), aJJfd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
16. 393 U.S. at 302.
17. When necessary to effect the legislative purpose, the Court is not bound by a literal read-
ing of the statute. See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1966); Board of Governors
v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 446-48 (1947). Respondent stressed the fact that Congress
did not use the article "a," although it could have done so, thus indicating that tax avoidance
had to be the dominant purpose. This position was accepted in Young Motor Co. v.
Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (lst Cir. 1960). See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text, The
Court in the instant case noted that the Report of the Senate Finance Committee stated: "The
proposal is to strengthen [the evidentiary] section by requiring the taxpayer by a clear
preponderance of the evidence to prove the absence of anY purpose to avoid surtaxes upon
shareholders." S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938) (emphasis added).
The court of appeals in Donruss Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1967), had
concluded, by drawing analogies to certain estate and gift tax provisions of the Code, that the
presumption of § 533(a) could be rebutted by showing that tax avoidance was not the dominant
purpose. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. The instant Court summarily rejected this
position, stating that the "language, purpose, and legislative history [of the estate and gift tax
provisions] are entirely different from that of the accumulated earnings tax." 393 U.S. at 309.
18. See Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693, 699 (1943). For a
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by a progressive reduction in the quantum of proof necessary to show
a purpose to avoid taxes upon shareholders, 9 resulting in Congress's
provision that a presumption of tax avoidance will arise if
accumulations are in excess of reasonable business needs. 0 The Court
conceded, however, that congressional realization that legitimate
business needs might require accumulation makes the applicability of
this presumption dependent upon a showing of unreasonable
accumulation. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded the
Congress intended the unreasonable nature of the accumulation to be
the significant factor in the imposition of the tax; any test requiring
tax avoidance to be the primary or dominant purpose for the
imposition of the tax is thus contrary to congressional intent. The
Court refused to adopt a policy which would upset the needed
presumption that arose upon a finding of unreasonable accu-
mulation.2' Although concurring in result, three Justices dissented
on the ground that under the majority opinion a jury was likely to
believe that it must find tax avoidance and impose the tax whenever it
discussion of the possible advantages to be gained by the retention of earnings, see Kipperman,
.Accunulated Earnings Tax: Burdens of Proof of Reasonableness and Purpose. 12 TAX
COUNSELOR'S Q. 307 n.1 (1968), reprinted from 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1050 (1966).
19. The tax was originally imposed on shareholders of corporations "'formed or
fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of such [personal income]
tax through the medium of permitting such gains and profits to accumulate instead of being
divided or distributed." Tariff Act of 1913 § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114, 166. The problems of
proving fraudulent intent led Congress to delete the word "'fraudulently." Revenue Act of 1918
§ 220, 40 Stat. 1072. See S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1918). In 1921, following
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), the tax was shifted from the shareholder to the
corporation. Revenue Act of 1921 § 220, 42 Stat. 227, 247. Personal holding companies were
exempted from the accumulated earnings tax and were made subject to a tax on undistributed
income because such companies, "[b]y making partial distributions of profits and by showing
some need for the accumulation of the remaining profits . . . [make] it difficult to prove a
purpose to avoid taxes." Revenue Act of 1934 §§ 102, 351, 48 Stat. 702, 751. See H.R. REP.
No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). After recognizing that the difficulty of proving tax
avoidance made the accumulated earnings tax relatively ineffective, Congress imposed an
undistributed profits surtax on most corporations. Revenue Act of 1936 § 14, 49 Stat. 1655.
20. This presumption was instituted in the 1939 Code and required the taxpayer to prove
by a "'clear preponderance of the evidence" that tax avoidance was not the purpose if the
accumulations were in excess of reasonable business needs. Revenue Act of 1938 § 102, 52 Stat.
483. The Senate report accompanying the bill stated that its purpose was to "strengthen the
[accumulated earnings] section by requiring the taxpayer by a clear preponderance of the
evidence to prove the absence of any purpose to avoid surtaxes upon shareholders." S. REP. No.
1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938). Section 533(a) of the 1954 Code omitted the word "clear"
from the phrase "clear preponderance of the evidence," thus somewhat easing the taxpayer's
burden.
21. The Court's motivation by the demands of administrative convenience is not new: "A
statute which stands on . . . the participants' state of mind may need the support of
presumption, indeed [may] be practically unenforceable without it." United Business Corp. v.
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is shown that a taxpayer accumulated earnings with knowledge of the
resultant tax savings, regardless of any evidence offered by the
taxpayer.22 Alternatively the dissenters suggested that congressional
policy would be upheld if the tax is imposed only when it is found
that the corporation would have distributed earnings had there been
no possibility of tax savings for its stockholders through
accumulation."
In order for the taxpayer to prevail in accumulated earnings tax
cases, primary emphasis should now be placed on showing the
reasonable nature of the accumulation, for once the presumption of
tax avoidance is made, the task of overcoming it is formidable.2
Because of the increasing reliance upon reasonableness as the test of
accumulated earnings tax liability, some guidelines should be
Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir. 1933). "The utility of the badly needed presumption
arising from the accumulation of earnings or profits beyond the reasonable needs of the business
is well neigh destroyed if that presumption in turn is saddled with [the] requirement of proof of
'the primary or dominant purpose' of the accumulation." Barrows Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962).
22. 393 U.S. at 311. The majority opinion rejected this argument by stating that
"purpose" is still relevant to isolate those cases in which the taxpayer made unreasonable
accumulations without the proscribed motive. Id. at 308. He may show that "even though
knowledge of the tax consequences was present, that knowledge did not contribute to the
decision to accumulate earnings." Id. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
23. 393 U.S. at 312. While the dissenters apparently agree with the majority as to the
result, adoption of their test might well cause reversal. Thus, if the taxpayer showed three valid
reasons for the accumulation, one of which was tax avoidance, he may well have made the
accumulation even if tax avoidance was not a factor. Any valid business purpose might thus be
sufficient to induce accumulation if considered alone. Where tax savings are possible the
business purpose may be of only relatively minor importance. In such a case the dissenters' test
would permit the presumption of tax avoidance to be rebutted by a showing of any business
purpose, however slight, which might have justified accumulation.
24. This is not impossible. See note 9 supra. Absent the condemned purpose, the effect o'
tax savings is not alone a foundation for imposition of the additional surtax. R. L. Blaffer &
Co., 37 B.T.A. 851 (1938), a]fd, 103 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 576 (1939):
Cecil B. DeMille, 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935), aff'd, 90 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 713
(1937). However, the effect is evidence of the purpose, because it can reasonably be inferred that
the controlling interests intended the obvious and natural consequences of their acts. Helvering v.
National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938). Once the presumption is made, however, many
factors militate against the taxpayer. Although the tax bracket of the shareholder is not
conclusive as to motive, Commissioner v. Young Motor Co., 316 F.2d 267 (Ist Cir. 1963), it is
a factor. R. Gsell & Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961); Carolina Rubber Hose
Co., T 65, 229 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1282 (1965). Furthermore, the existence of an obvious
alternative for achieving the same non-tax end contradicts claims that tax avoidance was not a
motive. Whitney Chain & Mfg. Co., 3 T.C. 1109, 1120, aJJ'd per curiant, 149 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.
1945). While lower courts have held that a corporation may finance purchases out of current
earnings rather than borrowing, United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d
Cir. 1964); Electric Regulator Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1964)-the
Supreme Court has suggested that an accumulation to pay off debt that could be refinanced
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established to aid those corporations accumulating income for
legitimate business purposes. At present none exist, leaving room for
abuse by both the Commissioner'6 and the taxpayer. Although the
boundaries of "business purpose" have been defined,27  no official
statement has been made as to what constitutes a "reasonable
accumulation" made pursuant to a "definite plan. 2 ' 8 Theoretically,
the nature of the accumulation is to be determined by what a
"prudent businessman would consider appropriate for the present
business purposes."" But while some certainty has been provided by
recent decisions30  making the operating cycle" the basis for
determining the need for working capital, the same cannot be said for
other business needs. A statistical analysis of past needs may be
relevant to the determination of the need for future working capital;
however, where the accumulation is for an unusual or infrequent
business need ,' it must be justified as reasonable in light of a
might be unreasonable. Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 693 (1943). Other
indices of intent include: loans to shareholders, loans having no relation to the conduct of
business, investments in property or securities unrelated to the taxpayer's business, and retention
of earnings and profits to provide against unrealistic hazards. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(c) (1968).
25. "Probably the only statement concerning the reasonableness of a corporate
accumulation with which the courts, the Treasury Department and corporate taxpayers all agree
is that each case requires a factual determination based on the circumstances involved."
Weithorn, What Constitutes a **Reasonable" Corporate Accumulation?, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON
FED. TAX. 299, 311 (1959).
26. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 2, at 211-12 n.3: "it is often alleged that
revenue agents threaten to assert § 531 deficiencies as a weapon to obtain agreement on other
deficiencies. It is inherent in such charges that they are easily made and easily denied, but nearly
impossible to substantiate or disprove." In view of the absence of guidelines in the Regulations,
such threats might easily result in acquiescence on the part of the taxpayer.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b), 3(a) (1968). Such purposes include: business expansion,
improvement of facilities, replacement of equipment, retirement of indebtedness and working
capital. Note, Accumulated Earnings and the Reasonableness Test oJ Section 537, 43 TULANE
L. REV. 129 (1968).
28. "it is contemplated that this amendment [section 537] will cover the case where the
taxpayer has specific and definite plans for acquisition of buildings or equipment for use in the
business. It would not apply where the future plans are vague and indefinite, or where execution
of the plans is postponed indefinitely." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1954). See
Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b)(1) (1968).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(a) (1968).
30. E.g.. Bardahl Mfg. Corp., 24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1030 (1965). See also Apollo
Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867, 876 (Ist Cir. 1966); Bardahl Int'l Corp., 25 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 935 (1966).
31. An operating cycle is the period of time required to convert cash into raw materials,
raw materials into inventory as marketable products, inventory into sales, sales into accounts
receivable, and accounts receivable into cash.
32. Such activities as expansion into new areas or the building of new facilities do not
occur so frequently that'a small corporation will be able to make a prediction on the basis of
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
"definite plan" of development. If such needs are infrequent,
projected planning may prove difficult and the amounts retained
excessive. The problem of establishing the existence of a definite plan
may present difficulties in view of the subjective nature of the test
applied3 3 What seems definite to the man closely associated with the
project may seem vague to the Commissioner, and, regardless of what
happens in the courts, this problem supplies a means of coercing the
taxpayer to settle other matters."' If the plan cannot be adequately
established, then the accumulation is subject to the penalty tax. The
Regulations are barren of adequate guidelines concerning the
accumulated earnings provisions of the Code. Considering that more
than two per cent of the tax cases docketed last year dealt with these
provisions,3  it would seem incumbent upon the Commissioner to
promulgate definite criteria for judging potential liability under these
sections.
past needs. Most businessmen would probably be inclined to accumulate more than they thought
absolutely necessary as a cushion against unforeseen problems.
33. Something more than a mere statement of intent is necessary in order to create a
definite plan satisfactory to the Commissioner. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner,
241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1957); Ted Bates & Co., 65,251 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1476 (1965). Such
intent may be evidenced by corporate minutes and documents, architectural drawings, and
correspondence made during negotiations. Levitan, DeJensive Planning to Avoid the 531
Tax-Sonie Techniques to Use, 26 J. TAX. 88, 89 (1967).
Intent is to be determined as of the time the decision to accumulate is made. Harry A.
Koch Co. v. Vinal, 228 F. Supp. 782, 786 (D. Neb. 1964); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.537-2(b), (c) (1959).
It is generally conceded that decisions of corporate managers are entitled to great weight when
determining the need to accumulate, Hardin's Bakeries, Inc. v. Martin (S.D. Miss. 1967), cited
in 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 647, 649 (1967), and should not be subject to second-guesses by the
Commissioner. R. Gsell & Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1961); James M.
Pierce Corp., 38 T.C. 643 (1962), rev'd on other grounds. 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964);
Breitfeller Sales, Inc., 28 T.C. 1164 (1957). However, hindsight may be applied by the courts to
determine whether there ever existed an intent to consummate plans for which accumulations
were made. Where such plans are actually carried out, hindsight benefits those corporations
whose plans were somewhat vague or indefinite. See e.g.. Dahlem Foundation, Inc. v. United
States (6th Cir. 1968), cited in 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5962 (1968) (corporate minutes showed
that real estate development company continually sought property to purchase); Bremerton Sun
Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965) (although petitioner had no definite plan at time of
accumulation it had a history of constant growth). Courts seem to place more reliance on their
own subjective determination of good faith than upon any objective standard.
34. See note 26 supra.




Taxation- Corporate Reorganizations- Merger of Multiple
Corporate, Entities May Constitute an F Reorganization
Bernard H. Stauffer was the sole owner of three corporations
located in California, Illinois, and New York In 1958 the Stauffer
operations were moved to New Mexico and the three corporations
were merged into one.2 There was no change in the business
operations or the ownership of the business.i In 1960 the new
corporation, Stauffer New Mexico, suffered a severe net operating
loss which it sought to carry back against the pre-merger income of
the transferor corporations. Stauffer New Mexico's application for
refund of taxes paid by Stauffer California for 1958 and 1959 was
approved.4 In 1963 the Commissioner assessed deficiencies against the
three constituent corporations, claiming that the corporate loss
carryback is allowed only to corporations qualifying under section
368(a)(l)(F)5 and that this section does not apply when more than one
corporation is involved; consequently, the losses of a surviving
corporation can only be carried back against the pre-merger income
of the same corporation. The taxpayer contended that the merger
qualified as an F reorganization and therefore such a loss carryback
was proper tinder section 381(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.' The
Tax Court held that an F reorganization is limited to the
I. All three corporations were engaged in the sale of weight reducing apparatus
manufactured by the California and Illinois corporations. The officers and directors were the
same for all three corporations. All board meetings were held at the home office of Stauffer
California in Los Angeles, where the books for the three corporations were kept.
2. The merger, ruled by the Internal Revenue Service to constitute a "statutory" merger
within the terms of § 368(a)(l)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code, was consummated on
October I, 1959, by the filing of the merger agreement with the Secretary of State in each of the
four affected states.
3. The merger agreement provided that the stated capital, paid-in surplus, and retained
earnings of the newly-formed corporation were to equal the sums of the respective items of the
three transferor corporations. All property of the transferor corporations was to be vested in
Stauffer New Mexico. The liabilities and obligations of the transferors were to be assumed by
the New Mexico corporation. Stauffer New Mexico also assumed the accounting procedures of
the three constituent corporations without change, as each of the three reported its income on the
fiscal year February I - January 3 1.
4. Section 6411(b) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary or his delegate
to make such a refund, known as the "quickie" refund, to the taxpayer within 90 days after his
application therefor.
5. An F reorganization is defined by § 368(a)(1)(F) of the Internal Revenue Code as
a "mere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected."
6. Section 381(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "[Ejxcept in the case of an
acquisition in connection with a reorganization described in subparagraph (F) of section
368(a)(l)- [t]he corporation acquiring property in a distribution or transfer . . . [involving the
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reorganization of a single corporation. 7 On appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed. The merger of multiple
corporate entities can constitute an F reorganization when the
proprietary interest in the transferors and transferee is identical and
there is no interruption of business continuity. Estate of Stauffer
v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).1
The F reorganization first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1921.
Section 202(c)(2) of that act included in the definition of corporate
reorganization a "mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization of a corporation (however effected)." This definition was
reenacted in identical language in the Revenue Act of 1924 except for
the deletion of the words "of a corporation."' The few early cases
applying the F reorganization provision, 0 while not defining its scope,
did establish one important requirement for its application-continuity
of ownership of the proprietary interest in the corporation. The F
reorganization was carried over into the 1954 Code, and in the late
1950's the Commissioner issued two very significant rulings dealing
acquisition of assets of a corporation by another corporation] . . . shall not be entitled to carry
back a net operating loss for a taxable year ending after the date of distribution or transfer to a
taxable year of the distributor or transferor corporation." Treasury Regulation § 1.381(b)-
l(a)(2) clarifies this section of the Code by providing that: "[i]n the case of a reorganization
qualifying under section 368(a)(l)(F) .. . the acquiring corporation shall be treated (for the
purposes of section 381) just as the transferor corporation would have been treated if there had
been no reorganization. . . . [A] net operating loss of the acquiring corporation for any taxable
year ending after the date of transfer shall be carried back in accordance with section 172(b) in
computing the taxable income of the transferor corporation for a taxable year ending before the
date of transfer."
7. Estate of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277 (1967)
8. The Internal Revenue Service recently announced that it will not follow this decision.
Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16, at II.
9. This deletion seems to reflect merely a draftsman's preference in eliminating the words
as surplusage. The House Ways and Means Committee explained the omission as a "minor
change in phraseology." H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1923).
10. The first case to consider the then equivalent of the F reorganization was Ahles Realty
Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1934), wherein a corporation transferred all its
assets to a new corporate entity in exchange for stock and bonds of the new corporation. The
old corporation then distributed these securities to its sole shareholder and thereafter dissolved,
The court held the transaction to be "a mere change of identity, form, or place of
organization," id. at 151, because there was a complete continuity of interest as to the assets of
the new corporation and its ownership, the sole stockholder of the old corporation becoming the
sole stockholder of the new and retaining his 100% interest in identical assets. In 1942 the
Supreme Court refused to find "a mere change of identity, form, or place of organization"
where, pursuant to a plan by which an insolvent corporation was foreclosed and transferred its
properties to a new corporation in exchange for the latter's common stock and stock purchase
warrants, the participating creditors of the old corporation received the rights to receive over a
majority of the stock of the new company, thus leaving the stockholders of the new corporation
with less than half the ownership of the proprietary interest they had enjoyed in the old
corporation. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1942).
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with the subject." In both situations, even though the reorganizations
would have qualified as statutory mergers under section 368(a)(1)(A),
the Service ruled that if the reorganization met the requirements of
section 368(a)(1)(F), it would also be an F reorganization. In Revenue
Ruling 56-276 the Service ruled that an F reorganization will be held
to be such even if it qualifies under one or more of the other section
368(a)(1) reorganization definitions. In Revenue Ruling 58-422,
involving a parent and two subsidiary corporations, the Service ruled
that an A reorganization could also qualify as an F reorganization,
but the Service restricted its ruling to the parent only. In both rulings
the Internal Revenue Service was careful to apply the loss carryback
only to a single corporate entity, or, in the case of a parent-subsidiary
group, only if prior to the merger consolidated income tax returns had
been filed. The Commissioner also adopted the view of the courts in
the early cases that the F reorganization definition applies to all cases
where there is complete continuity of interest as to the assets of the
corporation and its ownership.1
2
Despite its long history as part of the internal revenue laws, there
was relatively little activity with regard to the F reorganization until
the 1960's, when several cases were decided Which involved the
application of section 368(a)(1)(F) to a liquidation-reincorporation
situation. In 1962 in Joseph C. Gallagher 3 the Tax Court held
that a 38 per cent change in the shareholder's proprietary interest
would disqualify a reorganization from the section 368(a)(l)(F)
definition. In 1966 the Tax Court and the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a "substantial" change in ownership disqualifies
the transaction as an F reorganization. 4 However, the issue as to how
substantial a change in ownership is needed to disqualify a
reorganization from the section 368(a)(1)(F) definition is still very
much in doubt, especially -in light of the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Reef Corp. v. Commissioner that a 48 per cent shift in proprietary
interest does not disqualify the reorganization under section
II. Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 126; Rev. Rul. 58-422, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 145.
12. Rev. Rul. 58-422, 1958-2 CumI. BULL. 145, 146. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(c)
(1957).
13. 39 T.C. 144 (1962). See also Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1941-2 Cui. BULL. 62, holding that a
45% change in stock ownership will not disqualify F reorganization treatment, where the
transaction satisfies the requirements of both D and F reorganizations.
14. Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), al. d. 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966)
(50% change in proprietary interest sufficient to disqualify a reorganization
under § 368(a)(1)(F)).
15. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966).
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368(a)(l)(F). The facts in Reef also qualified the transaction as a D
reorganization, but the court held that where a reorganization meets
the requirements of both sections 368(a)(1)(D) and (F), it should be
construed as an F reorganization. In Davant v. Commissioner0 the
Fifth Circuit recently adopted the approach of Revenue Ruling 61-
156,'1 finding both a D and an F reorganization. The court found an
F reorganization on the theory that section 368(a)(l)(F) was intended
to apply to changes in form, as opposed to changes in substance,
where the corporate enterprise continues uninterrupted and there is a
complete identify of shareholders and their proprietary interests. The
Davant opinion uses the term "alter ego" to refer to the transferee
corporation, indicating that where the transferee is the "alter ego" of
the transferor, a Type F reorganization results. The Fourth Circuit, in
Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner,8 also used the term "alter ego" in
limiting the application of section 368(a)(1)(F) to cases where the
corporate enterprise continues uninterrupted, there being but a change
in corporate vehicles. Thus the case law has dealt with the question of
what will qualify as "a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization." There is no case law dealing with the significance of
368(a)(1)(F) when considered in light of section 381(b)(3),11 providing
for the carryback of a net operating loss occuring after the
reorganization .2 0
Looking first to the question of whether the Stauffer merger
qualified as an F reorganization, the instant court, relying principally
upon the Fifth Circuit's decision in Davant v. Commissioner,2 found
two factors necessary to constitute an F reorganization: first, the
reincorporation involved no change in the proprietary interest of the
stockholder; and second, the business enterprise of the transferor
16. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966). In Davant two active brother-sister corporations were
reorganized into one. Each corporation was engaged in a separate business and was merged
without change in ownership, but with a $900.000 cash distribution to the shareholders. The Tax
Court found only a D reorganization. The appellate court approved this finding but went on to
find an F reorganization as well, thus preventing the corporation's liquidation transaction,
taxable as ordinary dividend income, from disguising itself as a capital gains distribution.
17. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
18. 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965). One ground upon which the Fourth Circuit reversed the
Tax Court's finding of an F reorganization was the length of time (one year) between liquidation
and reincorporation.
19. Revenue Rulings 57-276 and 58-422 provide the only legal precedent for the definition
of an F reorganization for purposes of section 381(b). See note I I supra and accompanying text.
20. See riote 6 supra.
21. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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corporations continued unimpaired 2 To further bolster its finding of
an F reorganization, the court emphasized that the sword of section
368(a)(1)(F) cuts both ways. Thus, the court reasoned, the
Commissioner cannot vary his position as to what constitutes an F
reorganization depending upon whether the issue is the treatment of
capital gain, as in Davant,23 or loss carryback, as in the instant case.
The court determined that the definitive principles of an F
reorganization cannot vary with the position the Commissioner
prefers. The majority concluded that the reorganization in the instant
case involved a mere change in form, not a change in the substance of
the transferor corporations, and thus the acquiring corporation
became the "alter ego" of the transferors, resulting in an F
reorganization.
Turning its attention to the question of whether a loss carryback
should be allowed under section 381(b),24 the court implied that
Congress's failure to except the F reorganization from the multi-
corporate provisions in section 38 l(c)(1)(A) 25 indicated an absence of
any congressional intent to limit the F reorganization to a single
corporation.26 The court found that Stauffer New Mexico's having
had no pre-merger taxable year to which any loss could have
been carried back constituted further evidence that it stood in the
shoes of the pre-merger transferor corporations. The court found
merit in the taxpayer's argument that had the merger taken any one
of a number of other forms, there could have been a loss carryback to
one of the predecessor corporations.27 The instant court concluded
22. "In the instant case, the only change that took place was that Stauffer New Mexico
reported the combined income of the three pre-merger corporations in one tax return; the individ-
ual books of the constituent enterprises were kept as they had been before the merger; the enter-
prises continued to operate in the same manner and at the same location as before the merger; the
change was one of corporate vehicles only." 403 F.2d at 619.
23. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
24. See note 6 supra.
25. INT. Rthv. COD: of 1954, § 381(c)(l)(A) provides: "The net operating loss carryovers
determined under section 172 [are] subject to the following conditions and limitations: (A) The
taxable year of the acquiring corporation to which the net operating loss carryovers of the
distributor or transferor corporation are first carried shall be the first taxable year ending after
the date of distribution or transfer."
26. The court here assumes that the inverse of § 381(c)(I)(A) is a correct statement of the
law: namely that § 381(c)(l)(A), which does not exempt the F reorganization, would prevent a
carryback of a net operating loss of the transferor corporations to a pre-merger taxable year of
the transferee.
27. For example, if Stauffer Illinois and Stauffer New York had merged into Stauffer
California, the latter could have carried back a post-merger loss to one of its own pre-merger
taxable years under Treasury Regulation § 1.381(c)(l)-I(b) (1960). Likewise if Stauffer
1969]
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that section 381(b) permits a loss sustained by the transferee
corporation after a corporate reorganization to be carried back to a
pre-merger taxable year of one of three transferor corporations.
Finally, the court addressed itself to the problem of determining the
extent of loss which Stauffer New Mexico was entitled to carry back
and to which of the three pre-merger corporations the loss could be
carried. After first pointing out that tax avoidance was not involved,
the court drew an analogy to the "but for" approach in Libson
Shops, Inc. v. Koehler," stating that "[b]ut for the simultaneous
merger of the three corporations, the loss carryback would have been
undeniably allowed. '2 9 Therefore, the court concluded that the portion
of the losses sustained by Stauffer New Mexico attributable to the
operations of Stauffer California could be carried back to the
California corporation, but not to the Illinois and New York
corporations. The court admitted that this loss carryback would have
created problems had the three operations been physically combined,
but pointed out that this was merely a problem of tax accounting
which could not change the conclusion that the transaction in the
instant case was an F reorganization.
Since section 368(a)(1)(F) is a definitional section, it is
inoperative in and of itself, taking significance only when considered
in light of other sections of the Code, in this case section 381 (b)." The
critical question is whether section 368(a)(l)(F) can apply to the
reorganization of more than one corporation for the purposes of
section 381(b). The House version of section 381 originally denied a
loss carryback in all cases, 31 but the Senate proposed the allowance of
a carryback in exchanges involving mere changes of identify, form, or
place of organization.i It has been held that the F reorganization was
intended to comprehend "only such insignificant modifications as the
reincorporation of the same corporate business . . . under a new
charter either in the same or a different State, [or] the renewal of a
California had reincorporated into Stauffer New Mexico, then Stauffer Illinois and Stauffer
New York merged into Stauffer New Mexico, a loss sustained by Stauffer New Mexico could
have been carried back against the pre-merger Stauffer California income under the above
regulation. 403 F.2d at 619.
28. 353 U.S. 382 (1957). The Court in Libson Shops stated that "had there been no
merger, these businesses would have had no opportunity to carry over their losses." Id. at 388.
29. 403 F.2d at 621. See note 27 supra.
30. See note 6 supra.
31. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A135 (1954).
32. S. REP. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954) (emphasis added).
[VOL. 22
RECENT CASES
corporate charter having a limited life." '33 Thus it appears that the
legislative purpose in excepting the F reorganization from the loss
carryback provisions of section 381(b) was to prevent unfairness
through denial of a loss carryback to a corporation that was
essentially the same entity for tax purposes that existed prior to the
reorganization. Yet in the instant case it can hardly be argued that
Stauffer New Mexico was for tax purposes the same corporate entity
that existed prior to the merger. Although ignored by the Ninth
Circuit, the Tax Court pointed out that the taxpayer's three transferor
corporations took multiple surtax exemptions. The taxpayer also had
the advantage of three 100,000 dollar accumulated earnings tax
credits. The new corporation would only be allowed one such
exemption and credit. In Libson Shops the Supreme Court
distinguished the typical F reorganization situation of the
reincorporation of a single corporation in another jurisdiction from
the multiple corporate merger situation before it on the ground that
the multiple reincorporation involved the combination of several
businesses which, until the time of the merger, had been taxed as
separate entities. In the words of the Court, "this difference is not
merely a matter of form.
'34
Other significant changes occurred as a result of the
reorganization which cannot be characterized as "mere changes in
form." Prior to the merger only Stauffer California and Stauffer
Illinois manufactured the Stauffer products. Stauffer New York
purchased its needs from the other two and engaged only in selling
and leasing activities. There were undisclosed amounts of buying and
selling between Stauffer California and Stauffer Illinois. After the
merger a creditor of any one of the three transferor corporations
could look to the combined assets of the new corporation to satisfy its
claim, since the capital and surplus accounts of the constituent
corporations were combined. Although the instant court stated that
the problems arising from the intermingling of two businesses are
merely problems of accounting, the possible consequences of the
merger of two loss corporations and one profit corporation should be
obvious. Further, a loss occurring during the taxable year after the
merger gives rise to allocation difficulties in the carryback. These
problems would seem more serious than mere questions of accounting
practice.
33. Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743, 752 (1965), aff-d, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1966).
34. 353 U.S. at 388.
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There are other problems, here to be only mentioned, which tend
to cast doubt on the wisdom of the instant decision, given the great
administrative difficulties that can be foreseen. The first of these
involves section 1244 of the Internal Revenue Code3 When several
predecessor corporations are allowed to qualify under section
368(a)(1)(F), it is difficult to determine which prececessor, or whether
all the predecessors taken together, may be taken into account in
determining whether the complex requirements of subsections (c)(1)(E)
and (c)(2)(A) of section 1244 have been satisfied. Second, the instant
court's holding that an F reorganization need not be limited to a
single corporation poses difficulties in that a deficit in one corporation
would presumably offset surplus in another, thus affecting future
dividends that might be paid by the new entity. Third, it appears that
the advantages to the taxpayer as a result of the instant decision are
limited. The court's holding applies to the reorganization of multiple
entities where the proprietary interest of the transferors and the
transferee is "identical." Thus, even in the Ninth Circuit the taxpayer
will be permitted to carry the transferee corporation's post-merger
loss back to the pre-merger income of one of the transferor
corporations only where all the transferor corporations are owned by
the same shareholders with identical proprietary interests in each. It is
indeed unlikely that this factual situation will occur frequently.
In the instant case it appears that only by disregarding the pre-
merger corporate entities and treating them as multiple corporations
carrying on a single business can it be said that there was merely that
type of purely formal change which characterizes an F reorganization.
But, as has been demonstrated, this was simply not the case. Here
three separate surtax exemptions were taken prior to the merger, one
for each corporation. The three corporations constituted separate
entities, each conducting its own business, and were treated as
separate for all purposes, including the computation of taxes. Thus it
is submitted that labeling the unification of three separate corpora-
tions an F reorganization is tantamount to amending section
381 (b) to read:
Except in the case of an acquisition in connection with a reorganization
35. Section 1244 provides in general that losses on common stock of a "small business
corporation" may be deducted as ordinary losses instead of losses from the sale or exchange of
a capital asset.
36. The courts have been reluctant to disregard corporate entities. See. e.g.. Commissioner




described in subparagraph (F) of section 368(a)(1), and except when such
reorganization involves a merger or consolidation of multiple corporate entities...
(3) The corporation acquiring property in a distribution or transfer described in
subsection (a) shall not be entitled to carry back a net operating loss for a
taxable year ending after the date of distribution or transfer to a taxable year of
the distributor or transferor corporation.
Certainly Congress never contemplated the reorganization of multiple
corporate entities when it enacted section 381(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.
Taxation- Federal Estate Tax-Cotrusteeship Sufficient Inci-
dent of Ownership To Require Inclusion of Corpus in Cotrustee's
Gross Estate Where Possibility of Economic Benefit Exists
Decedent's wife, Vera Berns Fruehauf, paid all the premiums on
several insurance policies written on the life of decedent,' naming
herself as beneficiary2 and sole owner of the policies. Mrs. Fruehauf'
pre-deceased decedent by fourteen months. Under the provisions of
her will, decedent was named coexecutor of her estate, the recipient of
all her personal property, and cotrustee and life beneficiary of two
trusts containing the balance of her estate." The trustees were given
broad powers to retain the life insurance policies as long as they so
desired, to assign some of the policies to obtain money to pay
premiums, to designate decedent as a beneficiary, and to sell or
convert the policies for their cash surrender value At the time of'
decedent's death, there had been no distribution to the trusts as
I. Mrs. Fruehauf had acquired six insurance policies upon her husband's life, with a total
face value of $210,000.
2. Mrs. Fruehauf subsequently altered the beneficiary designation on each of the six
policies wherein she was made the primary beneficiary and her son, Harry R. Fruehauf. Jr.. was
made secondary beneficiary in the case of her death.
3. Mrs. Fruehauf provided in her will that the executors of her estate and the trustees of
the two trusts to be established were to be her husband, Harry R. Fruehauf, Howard B. Knaggs.
and the Detroit Bank and Trust Company. It should be noted that the two alternates Mrs.
Fruehauf authorized- Harry R. Fruehauf, Jr., and Thomas L. Munson- subsequently became
executors of the estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, along with the Detroit Bank and Trust Company,
all petitioners herein.
4. The powers of the trustees were stated broadly in Mrs. Fruehaut's will: "Imn addition
to the powers and authorities elsewhere granted in this Will, I empower the trustees or each of
the trusts created hereunder to do everything they deem advisable even though it would not be
authorized or appropriate for fiduciaries (but for this power) under any statutory or other rule
of law."
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
provided by Mrs. Fruehauf's will, and the corpus was then distributed
to decedent's son, as remainderman. The executors of decedent's
estate did not include the proceeds of the insurance policies in his
estate tax return, basing their exclusion on the belief that the
"incidents of ownership" necessary for inclusion within the gross
estate should be limited to the right of decedent or his estate to receive
the economic benefits of the policies The Commissioner asserted a
deficiency for the proceeds of the insurance policiesI claiming that
decedent, at the time of his death, possessed sufficient incidents of
ownership, either alone or in conjunction with others, to include the
policies in his gross estate under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue
Code.7 On determination by the Tax Court, held, for the
Commissioner. The proceeds of policies of insurance written on the
life of a decedent and purchased by another, but over which decedent
later assumes incidents of ownership as cotrustee, are includible within
his gross estate under section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code,
regardless of the capacity in which such incidents of ownership are
exercised. Estate of Harry R. Fruehauj, 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
Under section 2042.8 the proceeds of any life insurance written on
the life of a decedent and payable to other beneficiaries are includible
in an insured's gross estate to the extent to which he possessed at his
death any of the incidents of ownership over the policies, exercisable
either alone or in conjunction with any other person. It has been held
that neither complete legal and equitable title to the policies of
insurance nor their physical possession'0 is necessary to establish
incidents of ownership for inclusion in a decedent's gross estate.
Incidents of ownership have been found to be present when an insured
5. The petitioner's contention is based upon Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (1958): "IT]hc
term 'incidents of ownership' is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the
technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term had reference to the right of the insured or his
estate to the economic benefits of the policy."
6. The Commissioner determined the deficiency in the estate tax on decedent's estate to be
$75,462.68.
7. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2): "The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property-... (2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES.-To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any or the incidents of ownership,
exercisable alone or in conjunction with any other person."
8. Id.
9. United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 10 (Ist Cir. 1966).
10. Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965); Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340
I-.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965); Godfrey v. Smyth, 180 F.2d 220 (9th Cir. 1950); Hall v. Wheeler, 174
F. Supp. 41. (D.Me. 1959).
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possessed at the time of his death these powers: to alter the
beneficiaries under a policy," to surrender or cancel the policy,'2 to
borrow from the insurer against the surrender value of the policy,13 or
to assign the policy. 4 In determining incidents of ownership, there is,
however, a lack of unaniminity in the decisions dealing with the
capacity under which these powers are exercisable. The Tax Court
originally found that a limitation on the power of the decedent to act
only within the capacity of a trustee was immaterial. 5 This decision
was subsequently extended to hold that regardless of the actual
establishment of the trust, powers granted to a trustee in a trust
instrument must be considered to have been held by him as long as he
had the power to become a trustee at the time of his death."
Similarly, the First Circuit held, in United States v. Rhode Island
Hospital Trust Co.,' 7 that the phrase "incidents of ownership"
connoted something partial, minor, or even fractional in scope and
spoke more in terms of possibility than of probability.8 This language
indicated that perhaps any capacity of an insured to control the
incidents of ownership, even though this control might be exercised in
the capacity of a trustee, would be sufficient to include the proceeds
of the insurance in the insured's gross estate under section 2042." The
Second Circuit, however, took a different view of a decedent's
capacity in Estate of Newconib ('arltonY" In Carlton, the decedent
created an inter vivos trust to which he conveyed certain securities and
II. E.g., Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340
(1945): Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965); Commissioner v.
Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956); Fried v. Granger, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir.
1953); Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952).
12. Eg., Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nora.
Estate of Strauss v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 853 (1950); Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247
(Ist Cir. 1945); Ballinger v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 1312 (193 1).
13. E.g., Fried v. Granger, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953); Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d
247 (Ist Cir. 1945); Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1936).
14. Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
15. Estate of Albert Nettleton. 4 T.C. 987, 991 (1945). 'See generally Van Beuren v.
McLoughlin, 262 F.2d 315 (Ist Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 991 (1959); Estate of
Loughridge v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 294 (10th Cir.), ceri. denied, 340 U.S. 830 (1950): Union
Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944); Estate of
John Moir, 47 B.T.A. 765 (1942); Daniel J. Gallery. 38 B.T.A. 1211 (1938).
16. Estate of Ralph Budd, 49 T.C. 468 (1968).
17. 355 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1966).
18. Id. at 10.
19. Authority for this characterization of minimal powers, or powers held in differing
capacities as "incidents of ownership" could be derived by analogy from the language
of § 2038. See note 27 infra, and accompanying text.
20. 34 T.C. 988 (1960), revd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
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life insurance policies written on his life. There the court found that
decedent did not possess incidents of ownership at his death, even
though under the trust he retained the right to receive income in
excess of that needed to pay the premiums, as well as the right to
appoint himself as cotrustee.2  This decision was supplemented by the
Tax Court in Estate oJ Bert L. Fuchs,22 which held that the naked
power of a trustee to affect trust proceeds was insufficient to bring
insurance proceeds within decedent's gross estate.' :
In the instant case, the Tax Court noted that the fact that there
had been no distribution of proceeds into the trusts of which decedent
was to be cotrustee prior to his death was immaterial to the
determination of whether or not the incidents of ownership were
sufficient to include the proceeds of the insurance in the insured
decedent's gross estate.2 4 The court determined that "[lt]he material
fact is the existence of powers without regard to decedent's ability to
exercise them at a particular moment. '"2' The court also rejected
21. In holding that decedent did not possess incidents of ownership at his death, the Tax
Court stated: -Any control that decedent would have acquired over the insurance policies had he
appointed himself cotrustee would have been control over the policies jointly with the corporate
trustee as trustee only and such control would be solely for the benefit of the trust. Such control
as trustee would not constitute incidents of ownership in the insurance policies in decedent except
in his capacity as trustee for the benefit of the trust." 34 T.C. at 996. It should also be noted
that the obligations imposed on and rights granted to the trustees with respect to the policies of
insurance were strikingly similar to those in the instant case. See id. at 989-90.
22. 47 T.C. 199 (1966).
23. In Fuchs, the Tax Court stated: "The partners' agreement with respect to the .. .
policies created an informal relationship of a quasi-trust nature which obligated the partners to
deal with each policy in a manner conforming to the terms of the agreement. Assuming.
arguendo, that the insured of each policy herein possessed the naked power to change
beneficiaries or make an assignment, we cannot say, in view of the partners' agreement
regarding the policies, that the insured herein should be treated in any way differently than a
common trustee. Each insured herein was under no less of a legal duty to respect the terms of
the partners' agreement than a common trustee legally obligated to respect the terms of a trust
indenture. Decedent merely had the same type of power over the ...policies as a trustee's
power to affect trust proceeds. We do not believe that this kind of naked power alone is
sufficient to bring the insurance proceeds within decedent's gross estate." 47 T.C. at 204,
acquiesced in. 1967-1 CuNi. BULL. 2.
24. 50 T.C. at 921.
25. Id. The Court here based its argument upon the holding of Commissioner v. Noel, 380
U.S. 678, 684 (1965), which stated: "it would stretch the imagination to think that Congress
intended to measure estate tax liability by an individual's fluctuating, day-by-day, hour-by-hour
capacity to dispose of property which he owns. We hold that estate tax liability for policies 'with
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership' depends on a
general, legal power to exercise ownership, without regard to the owner's ability to exercise it at a
particular moment." The Tax Court had also previously held in Estate of Powel Crosley, Jr., 47
T.C. 310 (1966), that "'respondent [Commissioner] construes the failure of the trustees to exercise
all incidents of ownership as meaning that those incidents did not actually pass to the trustees, but
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petitioner's assertion that powers held in a fiduciary capacity were not
incidents of ownership. Analogizing the purpose of section 20426 to
that of section 203827 of the Internal Revenue Code, the court
reasoned that although decedent could only exercise power as
cotrustee, this could not alter the conclusion that the decisive factor in
determining incidents of ownership was the scope of decedent's power,
regardless of the capacity in which that power could be exercised."8
The court reasoned that frustration of both Code sections with tax
avoidance would result if applicability depended upon insubstantial
alterations made in the title given to decedent, rather than the powers
conferred upon him.29 The court further concluded that the fact that a
trustee owed a duty of faithful administration for which he could be
made to answer in an action at law or in equity should in no way
limit a determination that incidents of ownership were present 0 The
court concluded its analysis of incidents of ownership by holding that
Congress intended sections 2038 and 2042 of the Code to be portions
of a general tax pattern, subjecting property over which decedent
maintained power of enjoyment to inclusion within his gross estate.
Since capacity is irrelevant under section 2038,'31 no logical reason
exists which would require a determination of the scope of capacity to
be made in cases decided under section 2042. Therefore, since decedent
possessed broad powers, either individually or as cotrustee, to dispose
remained in Crosley [decedent]. Neither the failure to exercise ownership nor even a momentary or
temporary inability to exercise it matters. It is only important whether or not decedent possessed
at his death any of the incidents of such ownership in a general, legal sense." Id. at 320.
26 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2). See note 7 supra for the text of§ 2042(2).
27. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a)(1): "The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property-To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any
time made a transfer (except in case of a bona tide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the
date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity
exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person
(without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such power), to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of
decedent's death."
28. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 764 (1944); Welch v. Terhune, 126 F.2d 695, 696 (Ist Cir. 1942); Estate of John Moir,
47 B.T.A. 765, 772 (1942). It should be noted that these cases were decided under Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(d), 53 Stat. 121, and the Revenue Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch.
27, § 302(d), 44 Stat. 70, both predecessors to INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038.
29. The Tax Court here follows the logic of Union Trust Co. v. Driscoll, 138 F.2d 152,
154 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 764 (1944).
30. See Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, 177-78 (1933); United States v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11 (Ist Cir. 1966).
31. 50 T.C. at 926. See also notes 19 & 27 supra, and accompanying text.
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of any or all of the proceeds of the insurance policies, :" their inclusion
within his gross estate at the time of his death was appropriate.
The Tax Court in the instant case has firmly committed itself to
a position contrary to that taken by the Second Circuit in ('arlton.*'
The instant opinion suffers, however, in merely restating the
arguments considered in Carlton and avoiding a comparative analysis.
A major reason for the dilemma in the instant case is that neither the
Internal Revenue Code, nor the regulations, nor previous court
decisions give a comprehensive definition of incidents of ownership
when used in conjunction with powers which may only be utilized in
the capacity of trustee. The taxpayer is thus placed in the often
perilous position of determining the extent to which he may function
as a trustee without incurring the risk of inclusion of the trust corpus
within his gross estate upon death. Occasionally such a decision is
required, as in United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co.,:
where the court found sufficient incidents of ownership in the terms of
the policy. 5 The instant court's reliance on that case would seem
misplaced, however, when it is recalled that whatever incidents of
ownership exist are modified by the fiduciary capacity in which they
are held, and are thus subject to the fiduciary restrictions of state
law 6 Furthermore, the court's insistence upon the immateriality of
the capacity in which the incidents of ownership are held finds little
support in the Code. Reasoning by analogy has its limits; merely
because there are no definitive restrictions within section 2038 of the
Internal Revenue Code, it does not necessarily follow that there
should not be such restrictions within section 2042. Section 2038 does,
after all, require that the decedent be a transferor of the property,
37
thus encompassing a different situation that that contemplated by
section 2042. The possibility of harsh result upon the taxpayer is well
32. 50 T.C. at 926.
33. 34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962). See note 21
supra.
34. 355 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1966).
35. Id. at 8-9.
36. In Sloan v. Silberstein, 2 Mich. App. 660, 141 N.W.2d 332, (1966), a case in which
the other beneficiaries of a trust brought action against a trustee who was also a beneficiary
based upon breach of trust, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated: "In general, the trustee owes
a duty of ordinary skill and diligence in the administration of the affairs of the trust, complete
loyalty to the interest of cestui que trust, to show good faith and fair play in direct dealing with
the beneficiaries of the trust, and at no time may he use or deal with trust property for his own
profit or for any other purpose unconnected with the trust." 2 Mich. App. at 673, 141 N.W.2d
at 338. See also Estate of Harry R. Fruehauf, 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038(a)(1), supra note 27.
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illustrated by the facts of the instant case, in that decedent is
burdened with the insurance proceeds within his gross estate at death
without ever having been placed in a position to reap the beneficial
enjoyment of the proceeds. The instant case points up the need for
careful redefinition of the scope and intent of incidents of ownership, a
redefinition best promulgated by Congress.

